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Standing for (and up to) Separation of Powers
KENT BARNETT
The U.S. Constitution requires federal agencies to comply with
separation-of-powers (or structural) safeguards, such as by obtaining valid
appointments, exercising certain limited powers, and being sufficiently subject to the
President’s control. Who can best protect these safeguards? A growing number of
scholars would allow only the political branches—Congress and the President—to
defend them. These scholars would limit or end judicial review because private
judicial challenges are aberrant to justiciability doctrine and lead courts to meddle
in minor matters that rarely affect regulatory outcomes.
This Article defends the right of private parties to assert justiciable structural
causes of action, arguing that institutional, constitutional, and doctrinal limitations
preclude the branches from serving as structural protectors. Indeed, this Article
concludes, contrary to recent scholarship, that private claims fit easily within
established justiciability doctrines. To address legitimate concerns over utility and
judicial intermeddling, this Article argues that courts should confront the underlying
doctrine directly by adopting, where appropriate, a functional separation-of-powers
doctrine with meaningful remedies. Doing so will limit successful claims to only the
most important and thereby properly balance the political branches’ discretion under
the Constitution to design the administrative state with useful judicial oversight.
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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Election Commission issues advisory opinions that affect political
candidates’ campaigns.1 But all of the Commissioners’ appointments violate the
Appointments Clause.2 An appellate military court affirms a court-martialed
defendant’s conviction.3 Yet the judges’ appointments violate the Constitution.4 An
accounting firm incurs the time and costs of an investigation under the Sarbanes
Oxley Act.5 The enforcing agency, however, is not sufficiently subject to the
President’s control as the Constitution requires.6 An Article I court rules against a
party on a state-law claim, and that ruling, if effective, precludes a later-in-time
state-court judgment in that party’s favor.7 That Article I court usurps federal courts’
Article III authority in deciding the state-law claim.8
In all of these examples, regulated parties—those whom the agencies or Article I
courts had authority to require to act (or not to act) or to penalize with jail time or a
fine—asserted what I refer to as “structural challenges.” These challenges are based
on constitutional separation-of-powers safeguards and thereby implicate how the
federal government must be structured to pursue substantive policy.9 The judicial
decisions that established these structural defects prevented the relevant provisions
from being merely hortatory10 and furthered their goal of protecting individual liberty
by limiting federal authority.11

1. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 137 (1976) (per curiam). The Commission’s 1975
advisory opinions at issue in Buckley are available at Advisory Opinions, FED. ELECTION
COMM’N, http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/searchao [https://perma.cc/5LD8-2QZ6].
2. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 124–43 (holding that all Commissioners’ appointments
violated the Appointments Clause).
3. See Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 179 (1995). The tribunal affirmed the
petitioner’s conviction “except in one minor aspect.” Id.
4. The Appointments Clause, as relevant here, and the implementing statute required the
Secretary of Transportation—a head of department—to appoint the judges, but the
Department’s General Counsel had improperly done so. See id. at 179–80; see also 49 U.S.C.
§ 323 (2012) (requiring the Secretary of Transportation to appoint officers of the Department);
U.S. CONST. art. II, cl. 2 (permitting “Heads of Departments” to appoint “inferior Officers”).
The government conceded that the General Counsel’s appointment violated the Appointments
Clause. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 655 (1997) (referring to Brief for the
United States at 9 n.9, Ryder, 515 U.S. 177 (No. 94-431), 1995 WL 130573).
5. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 487 (2010).
6. See id. at 484 (“We hold that such multilevel protection from removal is contrary to
Article II’s vesting of the executive power in the President.”).
7. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2601–02 (2011).
8. See id. at 2608.
9. These challenges can also include those based on federalism, as discussed where
relevant in this Article. But I generally limit my discussion to separation-of-powers challenges
because of my focus on regulated parties’ challenges and the federal administrative state.
10. See Lawrence G. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893,
898–99 (1990).
11. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 298 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003)
(“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands,
whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”).
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But these challenges are of debatable utility. In nearly all of these cases, the
structural defect likely has little, if any, effect on substantive agency decisions. For
instance, consider the improperly appointed military judges mentioned above. The
judges simply reaffirmed the challenger’s conviction after they were properly and
swiftly reappointed.12 As another example, leading scholar Peter Shane has explained
that the regulated party’s victory in challenging the recess appointments of certain
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) members in NLRB v. Noel Canning13 (the
Court’s most recent structural decision) will almost certainly not “change the
outcome of the [regulated party’s] case.”14
In light of these benefits and drawbacks, should regulated parties have justiciable
causes of action to set aside agency action based on structural violations?
Part I.A describes how the Supreme Court has answered affirmatively but
provided little analysis.15 Sometimes the Court suggests regulated parties have
interests (or, sometimes, “rights”) and causes of action in structural safeguards. Other
times, such as in its most recent structural decision (Noel Canning), it is silent.16 The
Court indicated in Bond v. United States that individuals have prudential standing to
assert structural challenges,17 but more recently the Court suggested a different
paradigm that would render its analysis in Bond obsolete.18
In response to the Court’s cursory engagement with the utility concerning
structural litigation, scholars have begun to question these challenges altogether. Part
I.B discusses how the Court’s underlying separation-of-powers doctrine may be to
blame. Relatedly, Part I.C. considers how scholars have, instead, increasingly
questioned the justiciability of these actions in three key ways: (1) regulated parties’

12. The Secretary of Transportation approbated the General Counsel’s appointments. See
Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 654 (1997). A properly appointed military appellate
tribunal again rejected Ryder’s arguments that he had presented in his original appellate
hearing and again affirmed his sentence. See United States v. Ryder, No. 947, at 2–3 (C.G. Ct.
Crim. App. Apr. 23, 1997) (per curiam).
13. 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
14. Peter M. Shane, NLRB v. Noel Canning: Two Cheers for Recess Appointments,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 27, 2014, 5:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-m
-shane/nlrb-v-noel-canning-two-recess-appointments_b_5534824.html [https://perma.cc/BM2N
-6RK2]. Indeed, the NLRB recently ratified administrative, personnel, and procurement
decisions during the time at issue in Noel Canning to avoid additional legal challenges. See
Tony Mauro, NLRB Ratifies Actions Affected by Noel Canning Ruling, NAT’L L.J. (Aug. 5,
2014, 12:37 PM), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/legaltimes/home/id=1202665845879
/NLRB-Ratifies-Actions-Affected-by-Noel-Canning-Ruling?mcode=1202617518855&curindex
=3&back=GA&slreturn=20160004151247 [https://perma.cc/ZZZ9-FZ3S].
15. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 491 n.2
(2010). The entire discussion concerning implied causes of action occurs in three sentences in
a footnote.
16. See 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
17. 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2359 (2011); see also infra Part I.C.2.
18. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387–88
& n.3 (2014) (clarifying that “prudential standing” matters really concern whether a cause of
action exists and that generalized grievance concerns fall under an Article III standing
inquiry).
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Article III and prudential standing, (2) judicial remedies, and (3) the applicability of
the political-question doctrine.
First, there are Article III and prudential standing concerns. Article III generally
requires that challenging parties establish their standing to sue by demonstrating that
they have an injury in fact, that a causal relationship between the injury and the
wrongful government action exists, and that a court’s order can redress the harm.19
But regulated parties’ injury in fact (e.g., having to pay a fine, being subject to an
investigation, or taking an action that they would otherwise not take) does not seem
causally related to the underlying wrong because, as noted above, the same harm
always continues after the court invalidates a separation-of-powers problem.20
Relatedly, one prominent scholar, Aziz Huq, recently addressed the question of
private parties’ prudential standing to assert structural challenges (i.e., whether
prudential considerations should permit them to assert a structural cause of action
regardless of their Article III standing). He concluded that private parties, as opposed
to institutional actors, should lack standing (and a cause of action) to assert almost
all separation-of-powers and federalism challenges because the regulated parties had
no “rights” in the structural provisions.21 Huq’s main point is that permitting
structural challenges is inconsistent with the Court’s general standing norms.22
Second, I have highlighted elsewhere the often erratic and ineffectual remedies
for successful structural challenges.23 Although the Court occasionally considers
remedial concerns,24 courts often provide meaningless remedies, with little
discussion, that may place prevailing regulated parties in a worse position than had
they not brought their challenges at all.25 I asked (but did not answer) whether, if

19. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
20. See Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435,
1475–80 (2013).
21. See id. passim.
22. See, e.g., Huq, supra note 20, at 1464.
23. See Kent Barnett, To the Victor Goes the Toil—Remedies for Regulated Parties in
Separation-of-Powers Litigation, 92 N.C. L. REV. 481, 517–36 (2014) (arguing that courts
often provide meaningless remedies in separation-of-powers litigation that do not satisfy
relevant remedial values).
24. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,
507–10 (2010) (discussing whether severance of structural defect was appropriate); Ryder v.
United States, 515 U.S. 177, 179 (1995) (refusing to apply de facto officer or validity
doctrines); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 142–43 (1976) (per curiam) (considering remedies
and applying a “de facto validity” doctrine to validate prior agency action despite structural
defect).
25. See, e.g., Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332,
1336 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2735 (2013) (severing structural defect
provision, although challenging party appears to have sought invalidation of underlying
ratemaking decision, see Opening Brief of Appellant at 18, Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc.,
684 F.3d 1332 (No. 11-1083), 2011 WL 3918320). Moreover, in internal conference memos
in Buckley, then-Justice Rehnquist argued, without success, that “it would [not] be wise for
the Court to make a holding [as to the proper remedy] without the benefit of any argument or
briefing.” See Conference Memorandum from Justice Rehnquist re: Buckley v. Valeo (Jan. 20,
1976). All conference memos are available in Justice Powell’s papers, held at the library at
Washington and Lee University School of Law. See Powell Papers, WASH. & LEE UNIV.,

2016]

STANDING FOR (AND UP TO) SEPARATION OF POWERS

669

courts don’t improve structural remedies, they should preclude private structural
challenges because, after all, a right requires a meaningful remedy.26
Third, some scholars have invoked the political-question doctrine, under which
courts abstain from hearing certain causes of action out of respect to the political
branches. Huq, for instance, has argued that the President’s ability to remove
executive officials should present a political question27 and that the legislative and
executive branches—with limited exceptions—should be able to bargain over
separation-of-powers boundaries.28 Another influential scholar, Jesse Choper, has
gone much further, calling for the nonjusticiability of most structural challenges.29
Other scholars have advanced similar positions as to specific structural protections.30
These scholars, therefore, would generally leave structural protections to the political
branches for enforcement and preclude judicial review in all or certain structural
challenges.
Finally, scholars have criticized the Court’s underlying formalist
separation-of-powers jurisprudence (as opposed to structural claims’ justiciability).
This formalism erects strict boundaries as a prophylactic device, but it ignores
historical ambiguities,31 realpolitik,32 its decisions’ effects,33 and other values in
fashioning an administrative state.34 By tirelessly repairing fences among the
branches’ boundaries without regard to the significance of the intrusion, formalism
encourages parties to assert insignificant challenges and courts to grant limited
remedies.

http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=236 [https://perma.cc/M8EK-MDQ9].
26. See Barnett, supra note 23, at 500, 544–46.
27. See generally Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1
(2013).
28. See Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595
(2014).
29. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 363 (1980).
30. See, e.g., William Marks, Note, Bond, Buckley, and the Boundaries of Separation of
Powers Standing, 67 VAND. L. REV. 505 (2014); Peter Shane, The Supreme Court Should
Avoid a Constitutional Ruling in Noel Canning, REGBLOG (Sept. 24, 2013),
http://www.regblog.org/2013/09/24/24-shane-noel-canning/ [https://perma.cc/SB6T-N7QZ].
31. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1944–45 (2011).
32. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers,
119 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2314 (2006) (“[T]he branches purportedly are locked in a perpetual
struggle to aggrandize their own power and encroach upon their rivals. The kinds of partisan
political competition that structure real-world democracy and dominate political discourse,
however, are almost entirely missing from this picture.”).
33. See, e.g., Huq, supra note 27, at 52 (“[T]he presidential control/democratic
accountability nexus is causally weaker than the Court’s narrative suggests. Amplifying
presidential control consequently does not create a predictable quantum of greater democratic
control of administrative policymaking.”) (emphasis in original).
34. See id. at 8 (noting that the Supreme Court in Free Enterprise Fund “view[ed]
democratic accountability as a singularly important constitutional ideal,” despite scholars’
consideration of other goals).
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This Article responds to these debates in three key ways. First, it concludes that
the political branches cannot serve as structural defenders, rendering regulated
parties’ challenges necessary for vindicating structural norms. Second, it concludes
that these private challenges fit easily within existing Article III and prudential
standing doctrines. Finally, it concludes that the better method of addressing
concerns over judicial review’s utility is to create a more functional underlying
separation-of-powers jurisprudence with stronger remedies.
First. Part II concludes that faith in the political branches as structural guardians
is misplaced. First, the political branches lack institutional incentive to serve as
structural stalwarts. The branches are driven by partisan and policy-based concerns,
and they will generally defend structural prerogatives only when a branch’s
constitutional powers align with the interests of the political party that controls it.
Second, the Constitution and the Court’s current doctrine provide significant and
defensible impediments to aggrandizing the branches’ litigation power, a solution for
which certain scholars advocate.
The political branches’ disadvantages highlight the stakes in deciding whether
regulated entities have justiciable structural claims. The branches’ limited incentive
and questionable authority may lead to the underenforcement or nonenforcement of
structural protections. Regulated parties, even if by default, are the better champions
of structural rights. Courts should favor interpreting current doctrine to accommodate
their structural challenges, especially if the doctrine can easily do so. In other words,
courts should presume that judicial review is proper.
Second. With this presumption in mind, Part III concludes that, contrary to Huq’s
view, structural challenges are not aberrations of standing doctrine. Instead, these
challenges rest comfortably with existing standing and cause-of-action doctrine. To
be sure, Article III standing often requires injury in fact, causation, and redressability.
But the causation and redressability requirements are either inapplicable or
significantly relaxed for run-of-the-mill, ubiquitous procedural challenges, and
structural challenges should be treated similarly. Neither procedural nor structural
rights exist to preordain substantive outcomes; they exist to further other values, such
as those related to better decision making or the distribution of governmental power
to prevent despotism, by regulating how and who within government acts. With
standing in hand, regulated parties should also have an implied cause of action
because (1) they fall comfortably within structural safeguards’ “zone of interests” (a
longstanding inquiry) and (2) neither founding history nor historical practice is to the
contrary.
Third. Although regulated parties’ structural challenges should be justiciable, Part
IV addresses the utility concerns surrounding structural litigation. At bottom, the
various objections rest on the judiciary’s overly active role in structural litigation and
its failure to give the political branches sufficient discretion when structuring the
administrative state. Discretion is appropriate because, as others have noted, the
Court’s formalism as to several provisions is overly broad, lacks sufficient historical
pedigree, and denies the political branches the opportunity to balance competing
values when setting up a functioning bureaucracy. At the same time, judicial review
of structural design permits invalidation of administrative structures that affect the
branches’ core powers. Rendering structural challenges nonjusticiable (and thus
unreviewable) is too strong a medicine to cure the maladies of structural
jurisprudence.
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This Article concludes by briefly considering how more functional jurisprudence
can help and discusses two ways of how courts can turn to functionalism. First,
departing from their current trajectory, courts can directly adopt, where appropriate,
a more functional doctrine that grants the political branches discretion. Second,
instead of the limited remedies that they now employ, courts can provide maximal
remedies, such as not allowing agencies to act until the political branches enact
curative legislation and not relying on various doctrines that blunt the force of
judicial remedies (such as severance and stays of judgment). These meaningful
remedies, perhaps counterintuitively, will lead courts to narrow the underlying
rights—a phenomenon that scholars have identified in other areas.35 With fewer
structural violations, courts can constrict structural rights to their core meaning, leave
the doctrine more functional, and allow the political branches more, appropriate
discretion. The political branches can assist the courts and increase their discretion
by clarifying that they do not seek severance of structural defects. With a more
functional doctrine, courts can—without abandoning the structural constitution to the
political branches—provide optimal enforcement and address underlying utility
concerns.
I. STRUCTURAL “RIGHTS” AND JUSTICIABILITY
The Supreme Court has long recognized that regulated parties can assert
separation-of-powers challenges in multiple contexts. But exactly what relationship
those parties have with the separation-of-powers safeguards is unclear, and
justiciability questions linger, despite recent scholarly attention to them. These
unsettled questions are becoming more pressing as the Court has warmly received
structural challenges and welcomed a more meaningful judicial role in
separation-of-powers disputes.
A. Individual Interests in Structural Protections
The Constitution has numerous structural provisions that affect administrative
law. Perhaps the most prominent are the three Vesting Clauses, which vest
legislative, executive, and judicial powers in the Congress, the President, and the
Article III federal courts, respectively.36 Disputes over Congress’s legislative powers
typically concern whether Congress has impermissibly delegated its power to one of
the other branches of government (usually an agency) and thus violated the
“nondelegation doctrine.”37 Disputes over the President’s executive powers typically
arise in the administrative context when Congress has limited the President’s power
to remove executive officials from office.38 And disputes concerning the Article III
courts’ powers usually concern agencies’ or Article I courts’ jurisdiction over certain

35. See infra notes 380–384 and accompanying text.
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (legislative power), art. II, § 1 (executive power), art. III, § 1
(judicial power).
37. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
38. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477
(2010).
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common-law claims.39 But other key structural provisions, as relevant to this Article,
directly affect administrative architecture. For instance, the Appointments Clause
requires the President to appoint and the Senate to confirm principal officers of the
United States, and it requires inferior officers to be appointed, as Congress thinks
proper, in the same manner or by “the President alone, . . . the Courts of Law, or . . .
the Heads of Departments.”40 Likewise, the Bicameralism and Presentment
requirements in Article I provide a specific procedure for enacting legislation41 and
otherwise limit the ability of Congress to alter legal rights.42
Regulated parties have some kind of “rights,” “interests,” or other undefined
connection to these structural safeguards. But the Supreme Court has been unclear
about the precise relationship between regulated parties and these safeguards. For
instance, the Court has said, at times, that regulated parties have “personal rights”43
and, at other times, “interests” in Article III protections.44 As I have noted elsewhere,
the Supreme Court “has recognized a key difference between ‘rights’ and ‘interests’
(or ‘benefits’) in the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1983” and that difference affects the
availability of judicial remedies.45 But it is not clear whether the Court intends for
similar distinctions in the separation-of-powers context to have remedial
consequences.46 Likewise, the Court has held that regulated parties have an implied
right of action to assert challenges based on the President’s powers and the
Appointments Clause under Article II.47 The Court has allowed challenges to proceed
under Article I’s Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses, but it did so without
directly addressing whether the regulated party had rights or interests in those
requirements.48
Regulated parties’ interests—however described—derive from the purpose of
structural provisions. The purpose of the separation of powers (and federalism) is, at
one level, to divide or limit governmental power.49 This division of power does not,
according to the Supreme Court, inure merely to the benefit of the relevant branches
of government (or sovereigns) because the division of power is not an end in itself.
Instead, it is a means for protecting individual liberty from tyrannical government.50

39. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011); CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
848 (1986).
40. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
42. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the
D.C. Circuit’s judgment that a two-house legislative veto was also unconstitutional. See
Process Gas Consumers Grp. v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S. 1216, 1216
(1983).
43. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 848.
44. See id.
45. Barnett, supra note 23, at 496.
46. See id.
47. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 491 n.2
(2010).
48. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 935–44 (1983).
49. See Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364–65 (2011) (referring to both
federalism and separation of powers).
50. The Court has numerous statements to this effect. See, e.g., New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989);
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Indeed, Choper has written that the provisions’ purpose “cannot be seriously
disputed.”51 Because protecting individual liberty is the end, individuals are
“intended beneficiaries” of structural provisions.52 Their status, as the Court recently
held when permitting a criminal defendant to challenge a federal law based on the
Tenth Amendment, allows them to object to government action based on
separation-of-powers principles.53 This is so, despite the separation-of-powers’
purpose of protecting the branches of government from the others’ incursion,54
because “a law ‘beyond the power of Congress,’ for any reason, is ‘no law at all.’”55
The Supreme Court has furthered individuals’ structural challenges in various
ways. For instance, the Court has attempted to convey the importance of the
Appointments Clause, which provides relatively specific appointment procedures for
federal principal and inferior officers, by rejecting the view that the Clause’s
requirements are mere “etiquette or protocol.”56 Getting the hint, lower courts have
permitted Appointments Clause challenges outside of quo warranto proceedings,57
which usually impose procedural hurdles or require approval by executive officials.58
Moreover, they have eschewed engaging in harmless-error analysis, rendering a
remedy more likely.59

Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 298 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (“The accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny.”); id. at 299 (“There can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are
united in the same person, or body of magistrates . . . .” (quoting Montesquieu)); F. Andrew
Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 318–19 (2008)
(“The principal reason for dividing powers among the three branches is to prevent tyranny and
unwarranted government intrusion on individual rights.”).
51. CHOPER, supra note 29, at 264–65.
52. Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364 (referring to federalism); see also id. at 2365 (referring to
the “analogous context” of separation-of-powers challenges).
53. Id. at 2365.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2368 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S. 332,
341 (1928)).
56. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182 (1995) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 125 (1976) (per curiam)). Likewise, the Supreme Court has said that Article III protections
serve “primarily personal, rather than structural, interests.” CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848
(1986).
57. See Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1496–97 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
58. Taitz v. Obama, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Because Ms. Taitz is neither
the Attorney General of the United States nor the United States Attorney for the District of
Columbia, she does not have standing to bring a quo warranto action challenging a public
official’s right to hold office.”); J.H. Crabb, Annotation, Right of Private Person Not Claiming
Office To Maintain Quo Warranto Proceedings To Test Title to or Existence of Public Office,
51 A.L.R.2d 1306 § 3 (1957) (summarizing jurisdictional differences in seeking quo
warranto).
59. See Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1130–31 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that showing
of harm was not required for structural violation to exist); Andrade, 729 F.2d at 1495 (“The
[Appointments] [C]lause would be a nullity if it could be assumed that these very officials
would in fact have been properly appointed and (especially) confirmed by the Senate.”)
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B. Formalist Methodology
But the Court has done nothing more solicitous of regulated parties’ structural
challenges than to rely mostly upon formalist (as opposed to functionalist)
separation-of-powers doctrine. Because so many others have written at length
about formalism and functionalism,60 what follows is only a brief comparison of
the analytical methods. When engaging in separation-of-powers formalism, the
Court understands the Constitution’s three Vesting Clauses as dividing federal
power cleanly into the three branches. The separation of powers is “violated
whenever the categorizations of the exercised power and the exercising institution
do not match and the Constitution does not specifically permit such blending.”61 In
contrast to formalism, the Court sometimes engages in functionalism by
considering whether a particular practice or agency structure infringes the “core
functions” of the branches.62 Functionalism grants Congress much more discretion
to construct the administrative state under the Necessary and Proper Clause63 and
generally recognizes that the branches’ outer boundaries are indefinite and
porous.64
John Manning has cogently criticized both methods’ implementation.
Functionalism, he contends, can improperly “privilege general constitutional
purpose over specific textual detail.”65 This complaint was noticeable in CFTC v.
Schor.66 Despite longstanding precedent that Article III’s Vesting Clause
prohibited the removal of common law, equity, or admiralty claims from Article
III courts’ jurisdiction,67 the Court upheld an agency’s ability to hear a state-law
counterclaim for the payment of brokerage fees. This was so, notwithstanding the
Court’s concession that the state-law counterclaims were “at the ‘core’ of matters
normally reserved to Article III courts,”68 because agency adjudication of the
claims did not improperly undermine Article III’s purposes.69 With functionalism,
in other words, even previously marked boundaries give way to administrative
efficiency.

(emphasis in original); see also Ryder, 515 U.S. at 184 & n.4 (refusing to engage in
harmless-error analysis and noting government had not preserved argument).
60. See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86
VA. L. REV. 1127, 1136–47 (2000) (summarizing differences and scholarly debates concerning
formalism and functionalism).
61. Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CALIF. L.
REV. 853, 858 (1990).
62. Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74
VA. L. REV. 1253, 1255 (1988).
63. Manning, supra note 31, at 1951.
64. See Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489 (1987).
65. See Manning, supra note 31, at 1943.
66. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
67. See Manning, supra note 31, at 1954 (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856)).
68. Schor, 478 U.S. at 853.
69. See Manning, supra note 31, at 1953–54 (discussing Schor and functionalism’s
“underreading” of the Article III Vesting Clause).
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Manning’s key criticism of formalism, in turn, is that it reads into the three
Vesting Clauses a background separation-of-powers norm without recognizing the
following: the indeterminacy of the constitutional provisions, the failure of the
Founders to set an agreed-upon separation-of-powers baseline, the import of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, and the numerous compromises in the Constitution
that lack any shared theoretical basis.70 Manning identifies Justice Scalia’s dissent
in Morrison v. Olson as one example of this formalist failing.71 In arguing that the
Congress could not constrain the President’s removal power over executive
officers, Justice Scalia began by looking at the language of the Article II Vesting
Clause.72 He noted that it vested the President alone with all of “the executive
power.”73 But because the clause alone did not answer whether Congress could
constrain (as opposed to wholly take away) the President’s power over executive
officials, Justice Scalia had to turn to generalized separation-of-powers
principles.74
Despite its shortcomings, formalism has largely triumphed over functionalism.
The Court has applied formalism to the legislative veto,75 the Appointments
Clause,76 and the Tenth Amendment, generally without exception.77 Formalism,
with one notable exception,78 has also come to rule Article II in the President’s

70. See id. at 2022.
71. See id. at 1965–69.
72. See id. at 1966–67.
73. See id. at 1967–68.
74. See id. at 1968–69.
75. Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 431 (2012) (referring to Chadha as “textualist and
formalist in its methodology”); Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative
Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REV. 207, 212 (1984) (“INS v. Chadha was rigidly formalist in
effect.” (footnote omitted)).
76. See Manning, supra note 31, at 1958 (noting that formalism, when applied to
bicameralism/presentment and appointments, “simply enforce[s] the apparent
exclusivity of the detailed procedures specified”); Matthew Hunter, Note, Legislating
Around the Appointments Clause, 91 B.U. L. REV. 753, 759 (2011) (noting that the
Supreme Court has “fairly consistently applied a formalist analysis” to Appointments
Clause cases).
77. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism and Functionalism in Federalism Analysis,
13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 960 (1997) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s approach to federalism in the
1990s has been formalistic, not functional.”); Allison H. Eid, Federalism and Formalism, 11
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1191, 1193 (2003) (noting criticisms of the Court’s formalist
federalism decisions).
78. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691–92 (1988) (considering whether the
impediment on presidential removal power was “so central to the functioning of the Executive
Branch” to require that impediment’s invalidation); id. at 690 n.29 (rejecting Justice Scalia’s
dissenting, formalist position).
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removal-power decisions.79 Article III Vesting Clause jurisprudence has followed a
similar trend in favor of formalism.80
Formalism’s ascendancy encourages structural challenges and judicial
intervention. The Court has stated that separation of powers serves as “a prophylactic
device, establishing high walls and clear distinctions because low walls and vague
distinctions will not be judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict.”81 By
kowtowing to “the era’s perceived necessity” or “an expedient solution to the crisis
of the day,”82 a functional inquiry would improperly permit extraconstitutional
government, a fate “far worse” than a failed solution.83 To maintain the prophylaxis,
the Court tirelessly patrols the outermost boundaries of each estate to prevent any
minor incursion and repair any dented walls. Functionalism, in contrast, would
permit judges to rock on the porch with shotgun in hand to protect each branch’s
intimate living quarters.
C. Justiciability Concerns
As the judiciary has encouraged structural challenges, scholars have begun to
question their justiciability. These questions concern regulated parties’ Article III
and prudential standing (and related ability to assert a cause of action), prevailing
parties’ remedies, and the suitability of separation-of-powers questions for judicial
review. The Court has generally left these questions unanswered and wholly failed
to discern the multifaceted nature of the justiciability issues.

79. See Free Enter. Fund. v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010)
(rejecting Justice Breyer’s functionalist dissent); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730 (1986)
(rejecting Justice White’s dissenting, functionalist position). Numerous commenters have
recognized the Court’s Free Enterprise Fund opinion as formalist. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski,
Jr., Cooperative Federalism, the New Formalism, and the Separation of Powers Revisited:
Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of Presidential Oversight of State-Government Officers
Enforcing Federal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 1599, 1610–11 (2012) (“[T]he majority opinion[] in
Free Enterprise Fund . . . incorporate[s] and reflect[s] strongly formalist reasoning.”); accord
Michael P. Allen, The Roberts Court and How To Say What the Law Is, 40 STETSON L. REV.
671, 683–85 (2011).
80. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism Without a Foundation: Stern v. Marshall, 2011
SUP. CT. REV. 183, 185 (“[Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011),] is a marked departure
from other, more recent Supreme Court decisions that took a far more functional approach to
deciding when Congress could assign judicial matters to non-Article III judges.”) (referring to
CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986), and Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473
U.S. 568 (1985)); see also Krotoszynski, supra note 79, at 1610–11 (referring to Stern v.
Marshall as an example of the Court’s formalism).
81. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995) (concerning legislation to
reopen final judgments).
82. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992) (concerning federalism).
83. Id. at 187–88.
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1. Tensions with Article III Standing
The Court has created, despite its questionable pedigree,84 a well-known, tripartite
test that plaintiffs must satisfy to establish a “case or controversy” under Article III.85
Plaintiffs must first show that they suffer a concrete and particularized
injury-in-fact,86 in contrast to a legal wrong or mere invasion of a legal right.87 They
must show, second, that there is a “fairly traceable,” as opposed to speculative, causal
connection between the injury-in-fact and the impropriety of which they complain.88
Finally, they must show that a favorable decision will likely redress their
injury-in-fact, an inquiry that often overlaps with causation.89
Regulated parties have little trouble establishing injury in fact because they are
objects of government action. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court, before
holding that beneficiaries of an environmental-regulatory scheme had failed to
establish Article III standing, noted that if a plaintiff is an object of the action or
inaction at issue, “there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has
caused him injury.”90 This is so because the regulated parties must do what they
would otherwise not do (including paying a fine) or refrain from doing what they
would do. Because they are objects, as opposed to third-party beneficiaries of agency
action or statutory schemes, much standing scholarship—considering so-called
“public actions” and problems with restricting beneficiaries from suing—becomes
irrelevant.91 Regulated parties don’t present the problem of extenuated (or no) injury
or generalized grievances. They suffer injury because the government is directly

84. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Standing To Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional
Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 817 (1969) (arguing that injury-in-fact was not required
under British practice); Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing Doctrine’s
Dirty Little Secret, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 169, 229–31 (2012) (noting historical “ambiguity” over
propriety of public actions and finding historical evidence seems to favor public-rights view);
Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III,
91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 167 (1992) (noting that “stranger” or “citizen suits” were accepted in
English and early American legal systems); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and
the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1394–1406 (1988) (discussing
English and early American courts’ acceptance of suits that did not require the plaintiff suffer
injury-in-fact); see also Hessick, supra note 50, at 277–78 (arguing that injury-in-fact inquiry
for actions founded on private rights is “ahistorical and unjustified”). But see Anthony J.
Bellia, Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777, 825–26 (2004) (arguing
that proceedings were generally limited to injured parties).
85. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
86. See id. at 560.
87. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152–54 (1970)
(jettisoning “legal interest test” and adopting injury-in-fact test).
88. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
89. See id. at 560–61.
90. See id. at 561–62. Cass Sunstein has criticized the distinction between objects and
beneficiaries of governmental action as a “conceptual anachronism.” See Sunstein, supra note
84, at 188. Unlike Sunstein, I take no position on the propriety of the distinction or of
beneficiaries’ standing generally.
91. See supra note 84 (referring to scholarship concerning standing and “public” actions);
see also Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 68 (1984).

678

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 91:665

affecting their behavior or purse. And governmental control affects only the select
class of regulated parties (i.e., securities traders, companies creating pollutants,
banking corporations, etc.), not the entire U.S. population. Indeed, the Court held
that the challenging party who faced deportation in Chadha satisfied the Article III
standing desiderata when bringing his structural challenge because of the effect that
the agency’s action would have on him.92
The key standing defects in structural litigation, as Huq has noted, concern
causation and redressability.93 The Supreme Court’s decision in Simon v. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization94 informs both issues. In that case, indigents
and organizations with indigent members sued the Secretary of the Treasury and the
IRS Commissioner for violating the Internal Revenue Code (and the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA)) because the agencies gave favorable tax treatment through a
Revenue Ruling to nonprofit hospitals that offered only emergency-room services,
as opposed to both emergency and nonemergency services, to indigents.95 The
plaintiffs argued that the government’s action “encouraged” hospitals to deny
indigents nonemergency care.96 Nonetheless, the Court found it “purely speculative
whether the denials of [nonemergency] service . . . fairly can be traced to [the
government’s] ‘encouragement’ or instead result from decisions made by the
hospitals without regard to the tax implications.”97 Relatedly, the Court noted that
awarding the relief sought—requiring hospitals to provide more services to the
indigent to receive favorable tax treatment—would not create a “substantial
likelihood” that plaintiffs would receive their desired hospital services.98
Analogous problems arise in structural litigation. For example, Ryder v. United
States99 illustrates causation problems. The Court held that the appointment of a
military appellate panel violated the Appointments Clause because the appointment
was not made by a head of department (the Secretary of Transportation) but by a
general counsel.100 Nevertheless, the same officers were later properly appointed,
and they once again rejected the enlisted man’s appellate arguments.101 The enlisted
man’s injury-in-fact—his conviction102—did not appear to arise from the structural
defect because the same harm occurred both before and after the defect existed.

92. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 935–36 (1983).
93. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1475–80.
94. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
95. Id. at 28.
96. Id. at 42.
97. Id. at 42–43.
98. Id. at 45.
99. 515 U.S. 177 (1995).
100. 515 U.S. 177, 179 (1995).
101. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
102. His injury-in-fact was not the violation of any right to a properly appointed tribunal.
Such an injury would be a “legal injury” that the Supreme Court has clarified does not count
as injury-in-fact and, despite contrary decisions before 1970, is no longer relevant to the
standing inquiry. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970); cf. Lee & Ellis, supra note 84, at 200 (noting that violation of a statutory procedural
right alone under the Freedom of Information Act amounts to legal injury, not injury in fact).
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Redressability can be similarly problematic. For instance, in Free Enterprise
Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) began investigating the plaintiff accounting
firm.103 The firm argued that the PCAOB had too much independence from the
President because its members could only be removed for very limited causes by the
Securities and Exchange Commissioners (SEC), who, in turn, could only be removed
for limited cause by the President.104 The Supreme Court agreed.105 The firm sought
an injunction to stop the PCAOB from exercising its powers.106 The Court, instead,
severed one of the levels of protection from removal (leaving the PCAOB members
subject to the SEC’s at-will removal), otherwise left the statute and the agency fully
operative, and permitted the investigation to continue before the PCAOB.107 That
remedy allowed the investigation—the injury-in-fact—to continue, even if it was
now pursued by a properly subordinate agency, and the Court did not remedy any
past harm suffered.108 And, in fact, the investigation continued after the Supreme
Court’s decision.109 To be sure, some challenges that could lead to the invalidation
of a federal conviction, such as the one in Bond v. United States,110 are more likely
to satisfy all three Article III-standing requirements.111 But, as Ryder and Free
Enterprise Fund indicate, Article III’s desiderata do not always appear satisfied or
even considered.
2. Prudential Standing (or Lack of Causes of Action)
Aside from Article III standing, challenging parties must establish their prudential
standing or perhaps instead, based on a very recent Supreme Court decision, their causes
of action. In Bond v. United States, the Court unanimously held that a criminal defendant
had prudential standing to challenge a federal criminal statute under the Tenth
Amendment.112 In doing so, the Court—after distinguishing modern notions of standing
from an earlier decision’s inquiry into implied causes of action113—disapproved of
earlier suggestions that private parties could not have standing to assert Tenth

103. 561 U.S. 477, 487 (2010).
104. See id.
105. See id. at 484.
106. See id. at 487.
107. See id. at 508–10, 513–15.
108. See Barnett, supra note 23, at 518–21 (discussing theoretical remedial deficiencies in
Free Enterprise Fund); Huq, supra note 20, at 1477.
109. See Barnett, supra note 23, at 519 n.214 (noting that the PCAOB and the accounting
firm ultimately settled the dispute).
110. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011).
111. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1475 (“In Bond, the presence of the three canonical
elements of constitutional standing . . . were tolerably clear given the underlying proceeding’s
criminal complexion.”).
112. Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2366–2367.
113. That decision was Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, and
the language at issue is found at 306 U.S. 118, 144 (1939) (“[T]he appellants, absent the states
or their officers, have no standing in this suit to raise any question under the [Tenth
A]mendment.”).
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Amendment claims.114 The Court relied upon federalism’s aim of securing individual
liberty and, by analogy, on separation-of-powers jurisprudence in which private
parties have been the principal challengers.115
Huq has criticized Bond’s reasoning. In brief, he argued that private parties should
lack prudential standing (or a cause of action116) to assert structural claims for the
following reasons: no individual “rights” to structural safeguards exist,117 their
adjudication has substantial “spillover effects” (such as effects on states’ and federal
authority) that the standing doctrine generally avoids in other contexts,118 plaintiffs
have causation and redressability concerns,119 the relationship between liberty and
structural safeguards is weak, and the challengers will usually be sore losers from the
political realm.120 He argues that individuals should be able to enforce structural
safeguards only when the affected institution cannot do so, with exceptions for
matters that implicate due process concerns “based on assertions of legal authority
that are manifestly unreasonable”121 or Article III protections.122 Huq’s main point is
that, notwithstanding Bond, individuals’ structural challenges rest uncomfortably
with general standing jurisprudence.
More recently, the Court has indicated that prudential standing should be
reconceptualized as asking whether a particular plaintiff has a cause of action.123 In
Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,124 the Court, after
noting its inconsistent use of the term “prudential standing” and the inquiries that are
germane to it, stated that whether a plaintiff comes within the zone of interests of the
law invoked is really a question of whether the plaintiff has a cause of action.125 The

114. Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364.
115. Id. at 2364–65.
116. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1515 n.321.
117. See id. at 1448–52.
118. See id. at 1466–75.
119. See id. at 1484–90.
120. See id. at 1491–1514.
121. Id. at 1517 (emphasis in original).
122. See id. at 1519–21.
123. Scholars had so advocated for decades. See Bellia, supra note 84, at 779; William A.
Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 236, 252 (1988). But see Eugene
Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For, 93 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1684–85 (2007) (arguing that
standing addresses “whether individuals’ rights overlap in a way that can prevent their efficient
allocation” (emphasis omitted)). The Court continued merging justiciability doctrines during
the same term. It noted that “Article III standing and ripeness issues in this case ‘boil down to
the same question’” in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 n.5 (2014),
and reserved answering whether ripeness factors concerning fitness and hardship had
“continuing vitality,” id. at 2347.
124. 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
125. Id. at 1387. Although the zone-of-interests test derived from prudential standing
concerns under the APA, the Court has applied the test to statutory claims to which the APA
does not apply, see Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011), and to
constitutional provisions, see Valley Forge Christian College v. Am. United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474–75 (1982). The Court also clarified that so-called
“statutory standing” is a matter that goes to the merits and thus is not a jurisdictional inquiry
under Article III. See Richard Re, The Doctrine Formally Known as “Statutory Standing”,
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Court also clarified that, despite inconsistent treatment, inquiries into generalized
grievances concern Article III standing.126 The Court in Bond, merely three years
before, not only never spoke of the zone-of-interests test nor framed its discussion as
concerning causes of action, but specifically distinguished prudential standing from
a cause-of-action inquiry.127 Thus, it is unclear whether a prudential-standing or a
cause-of-action inquiry (or both) applies to structural challenges.
Although the shift from standing to causes of action may be merely cosmetic in
some contexts,128 the more thorough inquiry for causes of action is preferable here.
Standing focuses on a particular plaintiff, asking whether the plaintiff at bar is the
proper person to assert a cause of action that is available to someone.129 The
cause-of-action inquiry, in contrast, focuses more broadly on whether the (or any)
plaintiff has a right whose violation warrants judicial remedy.130 As we shall see,
speaking in terms of not only rights but also remedies, as causes of actions do, better
reveals how regulated parties’ ability to assert structural challenges fits with existing
doctrine, permits a broader consideration of justiciability arguments, and allows
judicial flexibility to refashion the breadth of these challenges through substantive
doctrine and remedies. I pursue this more robust cause-of-action inquiry in Parts II
and III.
3. Pyrrhic and Minimal Remedies
Judicial remedies for structural violations often betray courts’ solicitous attitude
towards structural challenges. As I have argued elsewhere, courts often fail to
provide remedies that satisfy key remedial values, such as compensating for past
harm, providing full prospective enforcement of the underlying right, incentivizing
parties to seek redress, and deterring structural defects.131 These inadequate remedies
derive from courts’ penchant in structural cases for minimalistic remedies,132 whether
through severance of offending provisions, remedial-mitigation doctrines, or stays to
avoid enforcement.
Courts often use severance to mitigate the remedial effects of structural defects.
For instance, the Court in Bowsher v. Synar,133 held that Congress could not remove

RE’S JUDICATA (Aug. 27, 2014, 2:30 PM) https://richardresjudicata.wordpress.com/2014/08
/27/the-doctrine-formerly-known-as-statutory-standing/ [https://perma.cc/2TUF-YQ58]; see
also Lexmark Int’l, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.4.
126. See Lexmark Int’l, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.3.
127. See Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2362–63 (2011).
128. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1515 n.321 (“To my mind, nothing particularly significant
seems to rest on the formulation of the issue as one of standing rather than a cause of action.”).
129. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1975); Mary Siegel, The Implication
Doctrine and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1088 n.18 (1979)
(“A cause of action is distinguishable from standing, because a cause of action denotes that
some party may sue under the statute, while standing focuses on whether the plaintiff has an
interest sufficiently adverse to create a ‘case or controversy.’”).
130. See Bellia, supra note 84, at 781; Siegel, supra note 129, at 1088 n.18.
131. See Barnett, supra note 23.
132. See id. at 536.
133. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
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the Comptroller General, who performed the executive function of deciding which
spending cuts the President was required to implement, without impeding the
President’s supervisory powers under Article II.134 The Court relied upon an express
“fallback” provision in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985 that, if the statute were deemed unconstitutional, called for the Comptroller
General to lose his executive powers and allowed the budget-cutting process to
continue without him.135 Courts may also infer Congress’s preference for severance.
Take Free Enterprise Fund, the decision in which the Court invalidated the PCAOB
members’ two layers of protection from presidential oversight. There, the Court
inferred that Congress would prefer the severance of one of those layers and permit
the remainder of the statute to remain “fully operative.”136 The D.C. Circuit more
recently extended Free Enterprise Fund’s inferred severance remedy in response to
the unconstitutional appointment of Copyright Royalty Judges137 because it sought
to create “as little disruption as possible.”138
Remedial-mitigation doctrines and stays of judgment also play a role. The Court
has done so mostly with Appointments Clause violations. In severance’s place, the
Court has turned to the de facto officer and different, though related, de facto validity
doctrines to mitigate the effect of a structural defect. The de facto officer doctrine,
although applied several times to prevent administrative chaos, is narrow.139 It
validates the actions of an officer whose appointment, as determined on collateral
judicial review, violated statutory law.140 For constitutional challenges brought on
direct review, the Court has applied, yet later called into question,141 the de facto
validity doctrine. Without any briefing from the parties,142 the Court in Buckley v.
Valeo applied the doctrine after finding that all of the Federal Election
Commissioners’ appointments were unconstitutional.143 The Court held that the
FEC’s past acts had “de facto validity” and allowed the Commissioners to continue
functioning fully during a thirty-day stay that the Court granted Congress to
reconstitute the FEC.144 The Court also stayed its judgment in Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. and granted an extension at the Solicitor
General’s request145 to give Congress time to refashion a bankruptcy system that
complied with Article III.146

134. Id. at 733–34, 736.
135. See id. at 718–19, 734–36.
136. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 481 (2010)
(quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987)).
137. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332, 1334 (D.C.
Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2735 (2013).
138. Id. at 1336–37.
139. See Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 180 (1995); Barnett, supra note 23, at 527.
140. See Ryder, 515 U.S. at 180–83.
141. See id. at 183–84.
142. See Barnett, supra note 23, at 530.
143. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
144. Id. at 142.
145. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 459 U.S. 813 (1982) (mem.).
146. See Barnett, supra note 23, at 535.
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The meaninglessness of these remedies for structural challengers may be most
apparent in Free Enterprise Fund and Buckley. In Free Enterprise Fund, the
regulated party prevailed in its Article II-based structural challenge to the agency that
had begun investigating its activities. The Court’s severance-based remedy failed to
compensate the prevailing party for past injury, failed to stop the agency from acting,
returned the prevailing party to an investigation before officers whose very
legitimacy it had successfully questioned, failed to ensure that any taint from the
unconstitutional investigation would not impact future events, and failed to see that
Congress and the President—who created the constitutional violation—had to take
responsibility for violating Article II by enacting curative legislation. The prevailing
parties in Buckley received a more insulting remedy. Despite the blatantly
unconstitutional appointment of all FEC commissioners,147 the prevailing parties
were not entitled to compensation or other injunctive relief for the agency’s past
action (any sovereign immunity notwithstanding) because the past actions were de
facto valid and the agency was allowed to continue functioning fully for another
thirty days.148
These inadequate remedies betray the Court’s paeans to structural safeguards.
Regulated parties’ interests or rights in structural safeguards do not appear as
important as the Court’s rhetoric proclaims. As the importance of the rights begins
to fall away, the case for structural litigation becomes less compelling.
4. Political Questions
Unlike most other justiciability doctrines, the modern political question doctrine
allows courts to ignore constitutional questions altogether—no matter who brings
suit, no matter whether proper remedies are available, and perhaps no matter how
patently unconstitutional a government action is.149 The doctrine prevents judicial
review when there exists:
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment

147. Congress knowingly ignored the arguments that the appointments were blatantly
unconstitutional. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 93-1239, at 137–38 (1974); Various Measures
Relating to Fed. Election Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Privileges and Elections
and the Comm. on Rules and Admin. on S. 23, S. 343, S. 372, S. 1094, S. 1189, S. 1303, S.
1355 & S.J. Res. 110, 93d Cong. 352–54 (GAO memorandum); Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Elections of the Comm. on House Admin. on H.R. 7612, S. 372, and Related
Election Reform Bills, 93d Cong. 141, 161, 192, 229.
148. See id. at 530–34.
149. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 253 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (noting
that judicial review may be appropriate for unusual circumstances in impeachment trials).
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from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.150
This humorously vague, multi-headed doctrine is, in Erwin Chemerinsky’s words,
“the most confusing of the justiciability doctrines,” becoming as unmanageable as
the standards that it eschews.151
What is more, the Court has applied it inconsistently to structural matters. It has
applied the doctrine to, among other things, the Republican “Guaranty Clause,”152
various constitutional claims arising from elections and redistricting,153 certain
matters concerning foreign relations,154 congressional proceedings,155 cases
concerning military training,156 and matters related to impeachment-trial
procedure.157 But the Court has refused to apply it to cases concerning the exclusion
of elected members from sitting in the House158 and the Origination Clause.159 And
the Court has addressed the merits of nondelegation, removal power, standard and
recess appointments, and Article III challenges—those that are most germane to
regulated parties and the administrative state—without mentioning the doctrine.
Jesse Choper has urged the Court to apply the doctrine to these areas, too,160 leaving
them to “the national political process.”161
Instead of addressing all structural challenges as Choper did, Huq has recently
invoked the doctrine for cases concerning only the presidential removal power. He
argues that the Court has not developed judicially manageable standards for
resolving these disputes.162 In brief, he challenged the Court’s two premises in Free
Enterprise Fund: (1) the President’s ability to remove officers gives the President
control, and (2) presidential control leads to democratic accountability.163 He argued
that the removal power can work against presidential control because bureaucrats
may seek to take more modest actions to prevent losing favor with later
administrations and that removal may be too blunt an instrument for control when
the President, with informational asymmetries, may not know which matters were
within officials’ control.164 Removal, too, can have high transaction costs.165 As for

150. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
151. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 128–30 (2d
ed. 2002).
152. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
153. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 151, at 135–38.
154. See id. at 138–40.
155. See id. at 140–43.
156. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
157. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
158. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
159. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990).
160. See CHOPER, supra note 29, at 263 (“The federal judiciary should not decide
constitutional questions concerning the respective powers of Congress and the President
vis-à-vis one another.”).
161. Id.
162. See Huq, supra note 27.
163. See id. at 6.
164. See id. at 37–38.
165. See id. at 41–42.
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control leading to political accountability, Huq argued that Congress’s budget-setting
powers and committee oversight can render it difficult to tell who’s to blame for
agency action or inaction.166 Moreover, voting is an ineffective method of signaling
preferences on an “unfettered range of federal administrative actions.”167
II. THE NECESSITY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Despite the significant justiciability concerns, structural challenges should be
justiciable. As a preliminary matter, courts should not apply the political-question
doctrine. Instead, they should presume that judicial review of individual challenges
is proper because political branches (based on their partisan and policy-based
decision making) cannot serve as structural defenders. Relatedly, the branches
themselves cannot litigate structural defects, as Huq would have them do, without
encountering doctrinal, constitutional, and pragmatic obstacles. The branches’
weakness as structural protectors in and out of court demonstrates the importance of
addressing the justiciability of regulated parties’ challenges.
A presumption of judicial review is sound and important. It provides a
background norm in assessing whether courts, in the face of ambiguity, should craft
justiciability doctrine in favor of review. Notwithstanding contrary suggestions, Part
III argues that regulated parties’ structural challenges rest relatively well with current
justiciability doctrine. But even if others are prone to conclude otherwise, this
presumption provides a normative reason for resolving doubts in favor of judicial
review. For the reasons that follow, judicial review of regulated parties’ structural
claims is vital because the political branches, contrary to other scholars’ assertions,
cannot serve as faithful defenders of structural protections.
A. Political Branches’ Lack of Institutional Incentive
Jonathan Siegel has made the institutional case for judicial review in the face of
revived calls for “popular constitutionalism.”168 He concludes that the alternatives to
judicial review—the electoral and the political/legislative processes—are worse for
several reasons. As a preliminary matter, using the electoral process is impractical
because of problems with engaging a majority of voters in relatively unimportant
issues or even key civil-rights matters that don’t directly affect them or a popular
group (such as Eighth Amendment rights for prisoners) and because of the costs in
electoral campaigning.169 Likewise, theoretical differences exist between judicial
review, on one hand, and electoral and political action, on the other. Judicial review
is more focused,170 more transparent,171 more appropriate for protecting the rights of

166. See id. at 53–56.
167. Id. at 64; see also Jonathan R. Siegel, The Institutional Case for Judicial Review, 97
IOWA L. REV. 1147, 1165–69 (2012) (discussing practical difficulties of using electoral process
to remedy constitutional violations).
168. See generally Siegel, supra note 167.
169. See id. at 1167–69.
170. See id. at 1169–70, 1178–80.
171. See id. at 1171–74, 1180–82.
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minorities,172 and available for individual litigants without collective action.173
Moreover, judicial review is based on precedent, giving “rights” a more established
character than when enforced through discretionary legislative or electoral
processes.174 Because of the courts’ institutional advantage in addressing
constitutional violations, courts should invoke doctrines that prevent judicial review
with care.
But Choper suggests that courts’ institutional advantages are inapplicable to
structural challenges. The political branches, he argues, have sufficient political tools
to guard their boundaries “jealously.”175 Focusing on executive incursions into the
legislative domain, Choper argues that Congress has the ability to resist executive
aggrandizement through, as most relevant to the discussion here, its appropriation
power,176 refusal to enact law,177 refusal to confirm appointments,178 and
impeachment.179 Because of these tools, separation-of-powers challenges, he argues,
should be “nonjusticiable.”180 Moreover, he argues that the electorate is the “ultimate
political weapon against consequential separation of powers violations.”181
Contrary to Choper’s foundational premise, the branches often don’t jealously
guard their boundaries and thus don’t use the constitutional weapons at their disposal
when structuring agencies. One needs simply to consider successful structural
challenges to find supporting evidence. Consider that the President agreed to the
defects that the courts have identified in the appointments in Buckley and
Intercollegiate Broadcasting System, the removal power in Free Enterprise Fund
and earlier cases, and the “legislative veto” in Chadha, although these defects limited
executive power. Likewise, in the two cases in which the Court found a
nondelegation violation,182 Congress enacted legislation that gave away its
legislative power. And the courts have generally been exceedingly leery of finding
Article III violations at all in the context of agency adjudication,183 suggesting
hesitation from even the judicial branch. To be sure, Congress and the President have

172. See id. at 1174–75, 1186–87.
173. See id. at 1175–76, 1187–88.
174. See id. at 1182–84.
175. CHOPER, supra note 29, at 275.
176. See id. at 282–85.
177. See id. at 285.
178. See id. at 285–86.
179. See id. at 286–88.
180. Id. at 263; see also Shane, supra note 30 (arguing that the Court should abstain under
the political question doctrine from recess-appointment challenges).
181. CHOPER, supra note 29, at 311.
182. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
183. See CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); see also Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A.
Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy Administration, 60 UCLA L. REV. 384,
417–18, 452–60 (2012) (noting that the Supreme Court in Stern appears to grant Congress
more room to assign adjudications to agencies than legislative courts); Joshua I. Schwartz,
Nonacquiescence, Crowell v. Benson, and Administrative Adjudication, 77 GEO. L.J. 1815,
1882 (1989) (“This ‘public rights doctrine’ appears to afford Congress freedom to commit
resolution of disputes between the government and private entities either to the article III
courts or to other tribunals—‘legislative courts’ or administrative agencies.”).
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taken adversarial positions in some circumstances, but these have almost always been
in the context of foreign relations, war powers, or criminal activity within the
executive branch.184 The administrative state’s architecture has failed to engender the
same adversarial positioning.
Instead, partisanship often subsumes the political branches. Daryl Levinson and
Rick Pildes have demonstrated that James Madison’s institutional-competition
model185 has given way to government organized not by branch, but by political
parties.186 The branches do not have “wills” of their own; instead, the branches only
have their respective members’ (including the President’s187) ideological or political
goals.188 Divided government should generally lead political parties and the branches
to have aligned interests as each party seeks to achieve different aims or limit the
other party’s (and branches’) victories. Likewise, unified government should cause
interbranch competition to wane.189 Since 1832, the government has more often been
unified than divided,190 meaning that the competing-branches model of U.S.
government is more often fictional than real. And even during divided government,
the President has weakened the executive branch. For instance, the unconstitutional
appointment in Buckley, the improper grant of removal power to Congress in
Bowsher, and the improper tiered protections from removal in Free Enterprise Fund
were all enacted during times of divided government.191 In addition, the electorate’s
limited concern for structural matters and its practical inability to influence structural
matters, as Siegel notes, render it unlikely that the electorate will become the valiant
protector of structural safeguards.192 Because institutional incentives do not
necessarily align with political ones, it is far from clear that the judicial branch, as
Choper argues, should abstain from deciding structural challenges.

184. See CHOPER, supra note 29, at 282–308.
185. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003)
(“Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”).
186. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 32, at 2312, 2313. Others have made similar
observations about the states’ failure to advocate for their own interests under our federalist
system. See, e.g., Miriam Seifter, Federalism at Step Zero, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 648
(2014) (noting that “state officials have numerous reasons—ideology, political needs, fiscal
concerns, personal gain, and more—to depart from the federal structure”).
187. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 32, at 2322.
188. See id. at 2317–18.
189. See id. at 2329; see also NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2605 (2014) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (“Senators may have little interests in opposing Presidential encroachment on
legislative prerogatives, especially when the encroacher is a President who is the leader of
their own party.”).
190. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 32, at 2330.
191. The Federal Election Commission Act of 1971 was enacted by a Democratic
legislature and Republican President, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act of 1985 was enacted
by a Republican President and Senate with a Democratic House, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 was enacted by a Republican President and House and a Democratic Senate.
192. See Siegel, supra note 129, at 1167–69; see also CHOPER, supra note 29, at 311.
Despite the limited salience of structural defects, I identify the President’s removal power over
high-level officers as a structural safeguard whose effects (but not its violation) could be
meaningful to the electorate. See infra notes 207–208 and accompanying text.
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Huq’s narrower call to deem removal-power cases nonjusticiable is more
compelling. Although Choper does not clarify the precise ground for
nonjusticiability, Huq identifies the Court’s problem as its inability to create
“judicially discoverable and manageable standards” for achieving the constitutional
good of political accountability (via the President’s control over subordinates).193
Recall that Huq challenged the removal power’s relationship with presidential
control because of bureaucratic timidity, informal asymmetries, and transaction
costs.194 Recall, too, that he challenged control’s relationship with political
accountability because of Congress’s influence over agencies and the limited ability
of the electorate to signal displeasure with the President’s oversight of the
administrative state.195 Because of what he viewed as the unsound premises
underlying the Court’s removal-powers jurisprudence, he called for the political
question doctrine to apply. Although having some merit, Huq’s arguments are not
wholly satisfying because the power to remove is likely more robust than he argues
(at least when the President hasn’t permitted Congress to limit the President’s power
to remove agency officials), suggesting that the President’s inattention to the removal
power in initial agency structuring is misplaced.
First, bureaucratic timidity seems unlikely for many politically salient officers.
Political appointees (and thus higher-level officers) are unlikely to be timid merely
to retain their jobs with incoming administrations. This is because they are unlikely,
by tradition, to remain at their positions when another party takes over.196 Former
Secretary of Defense Bob Gates’s service under the Bush and Obama
Administrations, for example, was noteworthy because of its rarity.197 Indeed, the
officers seem likely to go along with current presidential preferences to curry favor
for better positions within the administration, to show loyalty that could appeal to
later administrations of the same party,198 or to obtain presidential protection from
congressional reprisal.199 Lower-level officials may have more incentive to act
timidly because they seek to be career bureaucrats. Yet, even for them, many are
subject to removal for insubordination by failing to fulfill higher-up officials’ policy
preferences.200 Thus, removal (whether at will or for cause) can allow the President

193. Huq, supra note 27, at 22 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
194. See supra notes 164–165 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 166–167 and accompanying text.
196. See David Fontana, The Second American Revolution in the Separation of Powers, 87
TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1410 (2009).
197. Peter Baker & Thom Shanker, Obama Planning to Retain Gates as Defense Chief,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2008, at A1.
198. To be sure, Presidents, even without at-will removal power, can obtain significant
influence over independent agencies because of budgeting, regulatory coordination, and
chairmanship-appointment powers. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding
Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 30 (2010); Kirti Datla & Richard
L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L.
REV. 769, 818–23 (2013). It is hard to see how the President’s power over officers whom he
can remove at will is any weaker.
199. See Saikrishna Prakash, How the Constitution Makes Subtraction Easy, 92 VA. L.
REV. 1871, 1877 (2006).
200. See Kent H. Barnett, Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon, 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1349, 1374–76 (2012) (discussing accepted view that insubordination is proper ground

2016]

STANDING FOR (AND UP TO) SEPARATION OF POWERS

689

to control them, too. This is not to say that bureaucratic timidity doesn’t exist, but it
is a dull sword for severing the connection between removal and control.
Second, Presidents can remedy their lack of information concerning executive
officers’ control over regulatory results. They can seek to educate themselves about
how the decision-making process works, the legal regime in which the
decision-making occurred, and the external constraints influencing the officer’s
action. Doing so should not become too onerous considering the rarity of threatened
removals.201 Indeed, the removal power itself is one of many tools that the President
(and senior officers) can use to obtain information relevant to supervisory decisions.
Thus, the removal power can have a role to play in informational gathering and in
controlling bureaucrats’ actions.202
Third, the significant transaction costs in and rarity of removing an official do not
prevent removal—“a doomsday machine”203—from being effective.204 As Brigham
Daniels has argued in the context of agencies’ use and threat of “regulatory nukes”
(such as revoking a broadcasting license or an entity’s tax-exempt status) under a
game-theory model, nuclear powers provide leverage less through their use than
through their existence and threatened use.205 They allow policymakers, in other
words, to get their way without incurring the political costs of detonating the nuke.
This same phenomenon appears to exist with the removal power. Presidents rarely
have to remove officials; the mere threat of removal encourages resignations.206
Fourth, the removal of senior officials, unlike almost all other structural matters,
may be sufficiently salient to affect political accountability. As discussed above, one
should be generally skeptical of achieving political accountability through electoral
or lobbying efforts when low-salience matters or minority rights are at issue. But the
removal or resignation of salient officials, including Cabinet Secretaries, can
influence public attitudes of the President as the CEO-in-chief by mitigating his
association with bureaucratic incompetence or wrongdoing. The removal power
provides a tool for obtaining resignations and thereby allows the President to be

for removal limited to “good cause”).
201. See Thomas O. Sargentich, The Emphasis on the Presidency in U.S. Public Law: An
Essay Critiquing Presidential Administration, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 8 (2007) (noting “an outer
limit on the number or frequency of terminations that any administration can tolerate without
suffering the negative political repercussions of instability”).
202. And, of course, the removal power can also serve as a partial antidote to bureaucratic
drift. See Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Challenges to Civilian Control of the Military: A
Rational Choice Approach to the War on Terror, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1815, 1826 (2007).
203. Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White
House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 957 (1980).
204. See Barkow, supra note 198, at 30 (noting that removal is “politically costly for
presidents”).
205. See Brigham Daniels, When Agencies Go Nuclear: A Game Theoretic Approach to
the Biggest Sticks in an Agency’s Arsenal, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 442, 445–46, 504 (2012).
206. See Barkow, supra note 198, at 30; Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established
by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV.
1111, 1149–50 (2000).
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“doing something” about governmental problems.207 Recent examples abound.208 To
be sure, retaining or removing any one official is unlikely to affect many voters. But
the removal power allows the President to shape the composition of the executive
branch and help control the narrative that surrounds the President’s administration
and his or her political party’s performance. The historical practice of encouraged
resignations (likely obtained under the Damocles Sword of removal) suggests, at the
very least, that presidents view removal as influencing political accountability.
All of this is not to say that the Court has correctly understood the importance of
the removal power; correctly concentrated on this one executive power to the
exclusion of other powers, values, and political dynamics in drawing Article II
boundaries; or correctly decided Free Enterprise Fund. Nor is all of this to
undermine Huq’s useful insight into the limitations on the Court’s Article II
jurisprudence. My claim is modest. The removal power has some relationship to both
control and accountability even if it is weaker than the Court or certain scholars
suggest, and it suggests that the President should care about limitations on the
removal power when structuring agencies. Moreover, even if Free Enterprise Fund’s
reasoning is not satisfying (especially in the context of tiered protection from
removal209), it does not follow that the removal power is always insignificant, that
manageable standards for removal-power controversies do not exist, or—perhaps
most importantly here—that judicial review is undesirable in all cases.
B. Concerns with Branches as Litigating Parties
Aside from lacking institutional incentives, the branches (or the members that
comprise them) cannot assert structural challenges—as Huq advocates in almost all
structural cases—without doctrinal, constitutional, and pragmatic concerns.210 The

207. See Harold J. Krent, From a Unitary to a Unilateral Presidency, 88 B.U. L. REV. 523,
527 (2008) (“The power to remove an official is emblematic of a continuing relationship
between the President and subordinate officials and, in the public eye, links those officials’
conduct to the Presidency itself.”).
208. See, e.g., Dave Boyer & Jacqueline Klimas, Eric Shinseki Is Out! Obama Sacks
Veterans Affairs Secretary, WASH. TIMES, May 30, 2014, http://www.washingtontimes.com
/news/2014/may/30/eric-shinseki-out-obama-sacks-veterans-affairs-sec/?page=all [https://perma.cc
/BP43-SMRK] (noting that Obama accepted Secretary Shinseki’s resignation after meeting
with him and agreeing that resignation was partly political “to deal with Congress and [the
Press]”); Helene Cooper & David E. Sanger, Obama Says Afghan Policy Won’t Change After
Dismissal, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/24/us/politics
/24mcchrystal.html [https://perma.cc/8W4R-JERV] (discussing President Obama’s firing of
General Stanley A. McChrystal after McChrystal’s public criticism of Obama); Stephen
Dinan, Lois Lerner, IRS Official in Tea Party Scandal, Forced Out for ‘Neglect of Duties’,
WASH. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2013, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/23/lois
-lerner-irs-official-tea-party-scandal-retires/?page=all [https://perma.cc/S97Z-NGBP] (noting
that IRS Official Lois Lerner retired after being warned that she would be fired).
209. Justice Breyer’s functionalist dissent is especially compelling on this point. See Free
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 526 (2010) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
210. Huq has proposed a rule that “[w]hen an individual litigant seeks to enforce a
structural constitutional principle redounding to the benefit of an official institution, and there
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Court has been consistently hesitant about allowing the branches and their individual
members to serve as parties in litigation. The Court has worried that permitting such
actions would lead courts to resolve purely political disputes. Moreover, the lack of
institutional incentives for the political branches to guard their boundaries in the first
instance also suggests that they would lack incentives to litigate. Branch-standing
proponents overlook these doctrinal and institutional limitations,211 rendering their
proposed solution more complicated than it first appears.
As noted earlier, most structural defects arise through legislation that satisfied
bicameralism and presentment, meaning that both houses of Congress and the
President agreed to the structure at issue.212 Accordingly, likely challengers would
be the individual members of the affected branch who failed to convince their
colleagues otherwise. But they lack standing. In Raines v. Byrd,213 the Court held
that individual senators and House members lacked standing to have the federal
courts declare the Line Item Veto Act unconstitutional.214 In so doing, the Court
noted that awaiting lawsuits from private individuals, as opposed to politicians, keeps
the courts out of political disputes.215 Quoting Justice Powell’s concurring opinion
in United States v. Richardson, the Court argued that courts serve to protect
individual citizens’ constitutional rights and liberties, not to provide amorphous
supervision for government action.216 To support its position, the Court noted the
historical practice by which legislative members, executive officials, and Presidents
have not challenged legislation based on structural defects—including the limitations
on the President’s removal power in the Tenure of Office Act, the limitations on the
Attorney General’s authority based on the “legislative veto” at issue in Chadha, the
FEC appointments in Buckley v. Valeo, and the President’s pocket veto.217
Moreover, allowing the branches themselves, as opposed to the individuals within
the branch, to assert structural challenges presents its own problems. First, the Raines
Court seems schizophrenic on the propriety of institutional standing. It relies upon

is no reason the latter could not enforce that interest itself, a federal court should not permit
the individual litigant to allege and obtain relief on the basis of the separation of powers or
federalism.” Huq, supra note 20, at 1514. I have queried whether, if courts do not improve
remedies in structural litigation, “only the branches of government themselves should have the
ability to enforce . . . structural safeguards.” Barnett, supra note 23, at 545.
211. See generally, e.g., Huq, supra note 20 (failing to address doctrinal difficulties of
institutional standing for structural challenges).
212. See supra Part II.A.
213. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
214. Id. at 813.
215. See id. at 827–28; see also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2704 (2013)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the “opportunities for dragging courts into disputes hitherto left
for political resolution are endless” if branches can seek judicial review for usurpations of the
other branch); Melcher v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(denying review, on equitable grounds, of individual legislators’ lawsuit even if private parties
lacked standing); Riegle v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 881–82 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(noting that court would approve of congressional standing when private parties could not
bring claim at issue).
216. Raines, 521 U.S. at 829 (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring)).
217. See id. at 826–28.
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the failure of the President (the head of the executive branch) and the Attorney
General (the head of a department) to assert structural challenges in the past when
arguing that the individual legislators lacked standing and suggests that such standing
is improper under the “regime that has obtained under our Constitution to date.”218
But, then cryptically, it “attach[ed] some importance to the fact that [the individual
legislators] ha[d] not been authorized to represent their respective Houses of
Congress in [the] action, and indeed both Houses actively oppose[d] their suit.”219
How much importance attached is unclear, especially because the Court closed its
opinion by saying that “[w]hether the case would be different if any of these
circumstances were different [including if the Houses approved of the litigation], we
need not now decide.”220 At the very least, institutional standing after Raines was of
questionable propriety.221
The Court’s recent decision in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission222 further undermines branch standing. To be sure, the
Court held that the Arizona legislature, as authorized by both legislative houses, had
standing to challenge under the Elections Clause an independent redistricting
commission’s power to set legislative districts.223 But, citing Raines, the Court
carefully distinguished a state legislature’s standing from congressional standing:
“The case before us does not touch or concern the question whether Congress has
standing to bring a suit against the President. There is no federal analogue to
Arizona’s initiative power, and a suit between Congress and the President would
raise separation-of-powers concerns absent here.”224
But even if the federal political branches have standing, the Court’s jurisprudence
suggests that the branches can serve, at most, as proper parties only when they are
defending, as opposed to challenging, structural norms that the branches themselves
enacted. When Congress has served as a party in litigation, the Court has blessed its
service in defending legislation from a structural attack. This was the case in Chadha,
where the executive branch sided with the private party who argued that the
legislative veto violated bicameralism and presentment, and both Houses of
Congress intervened as parties in the litigation to defend the legislative veto.225
Likewise, although not resolving whether the House had standing, the Court in
United States v. Windsor226 relied upon the House of Representatives’ Bipartisan
Legal Advisory Group’s (BLAG’s) intervention to defend the constitutionality of the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) when holding that the executive branch, despite
its agreement with a challenging private party that DOMA was unconstitutional, had
prudential standing.227 Justice Alito, in his dissenting opinion in Windsor, found that

218. Id. at 828.
219. Id. at 829.
220. Id. at 829–30.
221. See Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1311,
1326–27 (2014).
222. 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).
223. Id. at 2663–66.
224. Id. at 2665 n.12.
225. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 939–40, 930 n.5 (1983).
226. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
227. Id. at 2686, 2688–89.
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the BLAG had standing “to defend the undefended statute.”228 These opinions all
suggest that legislative standing extends to the defense of enacted legislation but say
nothing about standing to assert initial challenges.
Although space constraints prevent full discussion of institutional standing’s
normative contours, doctrinal limitations make sense in light of circumscribed,
enumerated powers under Articles I and II. As Tara Leigh Grove has recently
argued, the President obtains standing in federal court based on his or her power
under Article II to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”229 This power
allows him or her to defend federal law and to refuse to enforce unconstitutional
laws.230 But it doesn’t give the President standing, Grove argues, to challenge a
federal statute merely to protect his or her own institutional or political interests.231
The President does not need judicial standing to prevent the enforcement of an
unconstitutional act; instead, he or she has the power to refuse to enforce or comply
with it. Article I, for its part, does not grant Congress any enumerated power to
challenge federal laws.232 Instead, Congress has familiar tools to control what it
views as structural defects—for instance, the House’s withholding of originating
revenue bills,233 the Senate’s refusing to confirm executive officers,234 and both
branches’ refusing to enact legislation that the President favors.235 Moreover,
permitting lawsuits by only affected individuals ensures that the dispute is more
than merely abstract and any judicial opinion more than advisory. By looking
outside of Article III when considering institutional standing, it becomes apparent
that allowing the branches to assert structural challenges would create, at the least,
significant constitutional questions and upset longstanding historical practice with
a defensible normative basis.
Finally, the same concerns that surround institutional incentives for the branches
to monitor separation-of-powers boundaries236 likely also apply to litigation. Recall
that partisanship and policy concerns affect how the branches look after their own
interests in drafting legislation.237 Recall, too, that the branches would be less likely
to protect their boundaries during times of unified government than during times of
divided government.238 These same concerns should be expected to affect the
branches’ decisions to litigate. The incentives for legislating and litigating are the

228. Id. at 2714 (Alito, J., dissenting).
229. See Grove, supra note 221, at 1314–15 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
230. See id. at 1327, 1329–30.
231. See id. at 1326 (“The Supreme Court has never held that the executive has standing
to assert an institutional interest in the enforcement of federal law or, relatedly, in protecting
any other duties or powers conferred by Article II. In fact, the Court has suggested precisely
the opposite: the executive lacks standing to protect its institutional concerns.”).
232. See id. at 1356, 1361. Indeed, Grove argues that, contrary to Chadha and Windsor,
Article I does not allow Congress even to defend federal law.
233. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
234. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
235. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
236. See supra Part II.A.
237. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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same; it is merely the nature of the action that differs. Accordingly, substantial
doctrinal and institutional-competence concerns suggest that reliance on the branches
as litigants is misplaced.
Disallowing institutional standing does not mean that the branches cannot have a
role in structural litigation when they are so inclined. As Huq has insightfully noted,
structural litigation—which impacts the powers and rights of competing branches
and individuals—is multipolar and thus “inevitably generates . . . spillovers to
unrepresented parties.”239 Allowing the branches to serve as amici and present their
views, as the Court has done,240 addresses much of this concern because it allows
courts to account more easily and thoroughly for the various interests involved. To
be sure, amici do not control when to sue, factual development, or the framing of
legal issues.241 But given the Court’s current receptiveness to interlocutory structural
challenges242 and formalism, it is far from clear that any narrowing of legal issues is
necessary or that factual development has much effect on the resolution of the
structural questions.
III. REGULATED PARTIES’ CHALLENGES SHOULD BE JUSTICIABLE
Regulated parties have Article III standing to assert structural challenges, despite
causation and redressability concerns, because these challenges are akin to
procedural challenges for which Article III relaxes or ignores its otherwise
mandatory desiderata. Likewise, regulated parties can also establish causes of action
because they are within the structural provisions’ zone of interests and because
history provides no compelling basis for holding otherwise. In short, their challenges,
contrary to others’ arguments, rest comfortably with existing doctrine.
A. Article III Standing
Not only do regulated parties serve as better guardians of structural protections
than the branches, but the Article III causation and redressability concerns
surrounding their structural challenges are not meaningful because of their
procedural complexion. The Court relaxes (or ignores) these two traditional Article
III standing requirements for procedural challenges to agency action. If it did not do
so, the mere possibility of a different outcome in continued or later proceedings
would, under Simon, be insufficient to establish standing.243 Structural challenges
should be understood as analogous to procedural challenges because both kinds of
challenges concern values related to how and who within the government acts, not
substantive outcomes.

239. Huq, supra note 20, at 1469; see id. at 1469–72.
240. See Grove, supra note 221, at 1361.
241. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1507–08. Huq also argues that allowing the branches to
serve as amici does not solve causation and redressability problems for Article III standing.
Id. at 1508. But, as described infra, the lack of causation and redressability is not meaningful
for structural rights. See Part III.A.
242. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010)
(addressing legal challenge before agency proceedings had concluded).
243. See supra text accompanying notes 95–98.
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When understood as analogous to procedural challenges, structural challenges fit
well within existing standing doctrine (notwithstanding Bond). This is important.
Huq, in seeking to limit individual structural challenges, readily concedes that his
proposal is inconsistent with Bond and several other cases.244 But recall that he
contends that Bond, which permits individual standing, does not fit as comfortably
with current standing doctrine as his proposal for more muscular institutional
standing.245 Not only did Part II, supra, identify significant concerns over
institutional standing, but this Part concludes that Huq is mistaken as to justiciability.
1. Relaxed Article III Desiderata for Procedural Challenges
Article III does not require causation and redressability (nor even injury in fact) in
all cases. In a footnote after outlining the three-part Article III test, the Lujan Court
deemed procedural rights “special” because one asserting a procedural right need not
meet all the “normal standards for redressability and immediacy.”246 The Court then
gave an example in which a challenger who lived next to a proposed federally-licensed
dam could challenge an agency’s failure to prepare an environmental impact statement,
as required by statute.247 Presumably the challenger’s injury in fact would include the
aesthetic or economic harm from having to live next to a dam. This challenge would
be permissible despite, as the Court admitted, a lack of a causal connection between
the statement’s preparation (the procedure at issue) and whether the dam would be
built (the substantive decision that creates the injury in fact).248 And, relatedly, a
judicial order that required the agency to prepare the statement would not necessarily
redress the challenger’s harm in fact because the dam could be built after the agency
prepared it. The Court reaffirmed the procedural-challenge exception in
Massachusetts v. EPA, holding that standing exists “if there is some possibility that
the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision
that allegedly harmed the litigant.”249
Evan Tsen Lee and Josephine Mason Ellis have identified an even more striking
example under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).250 FOIA allows “any
person” to obtain nonexempt records if properly requested.251 The requesting party
can obtain the documents for any reason, including idle curiosity.252 If the request is
denied, the curious party could sue to obtain the documents.253 The denial would not
create an injury in fact because hindering one’s curiosity would, under the Court’s
doctrine, very likely not constitute a sufficiently concrete or otherwise cognizable

244. Huq, supra 20, at 1515.
245. See id. (“[M]y proposed rule fits more comfortably with current standing doctrine
than Bond.”).
246. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992).
247. Id.
248. See id.
249. 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7).
250. See Lee & Ellis, supra note 84, at 193–201.
251. See id. at 194 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2006)).
252. See id. at 194, 173 n.18.
253. See id. at 194.
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harm.254 Moreover, the mere violation of one’s legal right to obtain documents is not
an injury in fact, but a mere (and, since 1970, irrelevant) legal injury. Because there
need not be any harm, there is no causation between the nonexistent injury-in-fact
and the complained-of action, and a judicial order requiring the government to grant
the request does not (and cannot) redress the nonexistent injury in fact.255
The procedural exception—although rarely expressed as such before Lujan—has
established provenance in judicial review of administrative agencies. Under a
well-enshrined principle from SEC v. Chenery, courts can uphold agency action only
on the grounds upon which the agency relied.256 If the court does not uphold the
agency action, the court generally must remand to the agency for the agency to
reconsider its decision.257 The judicial remedy provides the prevailing party a chance
for the agency to change its decision and thus a chance to cure its injury in fact. But
the remedy does not guarantee it because “most petitioners have at most a slim
chance their underlying injury will ever be redressed.”258 Ultimately, had Lujan not
recognized a procedural exception, Lujan would have “imposed a constitutional
obstacle to most ordinary administrative law cases.”259
The procedural-rights exception makes sense because requiring redressability
misses the point of procedural rights. “[P]rocedural rights have only speculative
consequences for a litigant.”260 They do not exist, as Cass Sunstein has pointed out,
to “dictate outcomes but to . . . produce certain regulatory incentives.”261 Unless the
Article III desiderata are relaxed, judicial review would be absent. The consequence
is that the regulatory incentives for better decision making, accountability,
transparency, and fairness, among other values, lose their force. Regulated parties’
procedural rights—such as the rights to provide comments on pending rules to the
agency, to have the agency follow self-enacted rules, to require the agency to disclose
certain information publicly, or to appear before unbiased fact-finders—would be
nothing but platitudes whose enforcement depends upon the whim of the
administering agency.
Moreover, allowing these procedural challenges to proceed is consistent with
broader historical practice.262 Public actions, whereby private parties seek to
vindicate public interests and limitations on government action without establishing
injury in fact, were features of English and early American law.263 This was so even
after the enactment of the Federal Constitution, which requires a “case or

254. See id. at 196.
255. See id. at 197.
256. 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943).
257. See id. at 95.
258. See Lee & Ellis, supra note 84, at 202.
259. Sunstein, supra note 84, at 208.
260. Id. at 225.
261. See id. at 226.
262. See Lee & Ellis, supra note 84, at 229.
263. See id. at 174; see also supra note 84. Likewise, “[f]airness, as a property of
procedural schemes, may also be a value that generates rights that do not necessarily promote
the interests of particular right-holders in either a well-being or an agency sense.” Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L. REV. 343, 355 (1993).
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controversy” under Article III.264 Indeed, “there is no direct evidence that injury in
fact or concrete interest was intended to be a constitutional prerequisite under Article
III.”265
As a final matter, procedural rights can be reasonably defined. Procedural rights,
as Sunstein argued, do not mandate what government does.266 Instead, the values that
they seek to further relate to different matters: how government must act to
implement policy and who within government can act. Within the former category
are rules that, for example, require agencies to provide notice-and-comment
opportunities or provide explanations of their decisions.267 Within the latter category
are rules requiring an administrative law judge to preside over formal hearings268 or
provisions that identify which agency has jurisdiction over a particular regulated
party.269 In contrast, provisions that foreclose certain outcomes that affect regulated
parties’ behavior—like triggers for deportation or those that concern elements for a
civil violation—are substantive.
To be sure, these distinctions between substantive and procedural actions, as
elsewhere in the law, are not without indeterminacy problems. Debates are almost
certain to occur around the margins in the procedural-exception context, just as they
do in the Erie choice-of-law context.270 For instance, how should one categorize
statutory or regulatory rules of evidence? Although they concern how the
government must prove its case, they are subject to harmless-error review, thereby
leading courts to consider the likelihood of changed results on remand (and notions
of causation and redressability, even if not in the standing context).271 Likewise,
questions of an agency’s jurisdiction over certain subject matter may implicate not
only who may regulate (for instance, as to which agency has authority to regulate the
challenging party’s industry) but also what that agency may do (for instance, whether
the agency can require certain industry disclosures even if other procedures are
followed). This definitional indeterminacy gives me pause. But I take comfort in the
fact that, despite more than twenty years passing since Lujan, courts have not
appeared to face significant difficulty over categorization,272 the solid footing upon

264. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343, 354 (1875) (allowing suit in
which merchants sought to enforce “a duty to the public generally”); Winter, supra note 84,
at 1394–95 (“[T]he English, colonial, and post-constitutional practices suggest that the
contemporaneous understanding of the ‘case or controversy’ clause considered as justiciable
actions concerning general governmental unlawfulness, even in the absence of injury to any
specific person, and even when prosecuted by any common citizen . . . .”).
265. Sunstein, supra note 84, at 173.
266. See id. at 226.
267. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
268. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(b)(3) (2012).
269. See Kim B. Perez, Note, The CFPB “Indirectly” Regulates Lending Through Auto
Dealers, 18 N.C. BANK. INST. 399 (2014) (discussing debate over CFPB’s ability to regulate
auto dealers under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)). If not subject to the CFPB’s
oversight, auto dealers would be subject to the Federal Trade Commission’s. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1691(c) (2012).
270. See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, Procedure, Substance, and Erie, 64 VAND. L. REV. 877,
882–83, 896–904 (2011).
271. See, e.g., Gunderson v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 601 F.3d 1013, 1027 (10th Cir. 2010).
272. The majority in Lujan did not define “procedural rights.” Lee and Ellis defined the
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which the procedural exception rests in administrative law based on Chenery, and
the ubiquitous substantive-procedural divide throughout law.
2. Similarities Between Structural and Procedural Challenges
Structural rights share key characteristics with procedural ones found in statutes
or regulations. None seek to mandate a particular outcome for any substantive
decision. Instead, they seek to further other values. For instance, presentment and
bicameralism seek to “protect[] residents of small states and minimiz[e] interest
group influence.”273 The Appointments Clause, as another example, seeks to limit
despotism (through what the Founders understood as the “insidious” appointments
to office) and create accountability in appointing officials or branches.274 Judicial
enforcement of these and other constitutional structural safeguards, like statutory or
regulatory ones, does not mean that a prevailing party will always obtain relief for
its injury in fact.275 It merely provides validation of the norm that seeks to further
underlying values.
Procedural and structural rights further these values in similar ways. They seek to
affect either values related to how a decision is reached276 or who can take a certain
action. For example, the Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses and the
Appointments Clause detail how to enact legislation and to appoint officers (and to
some extent, who can legislate, sign legislation, and appoint). Similarly, the Vesting
Clauses, the Recess Appointments Clause, and Impeachment Clause identify who
can exercise judicial, legislative, and executive functions. None of these clauses
require or prohibit any particular underlying policy decision. The same substantive
policy that failed to undergo bicameralism and presentment (say, as particularly
germane in 2015, immigration policies promulgated via questionable executive
orders277) can gain force as legislation by following constitutional procedural

term as they understood Justice Scalia to have done—rights conferred by statute or regulation
that are divorced from “‘real-world’ desiderata” and that may not “make any difference in the
real world.” Lee & Ellis, supra note 84, at 174 n.21. But Justice Blackmun, in his Lujan
dissent, lamented that the meaning of the term was far from clear and sympathized with “courts
across the country that will struggle to understand the Court’s standardless exposition of this
concept.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 601–02 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). I have not uncovered a decision in which the federal appellate courts, in the more
than twenty years since Lujan, have had to grapple with the definitional problems in footnote
seven, suggesting that the significant definitional problem that Justice Blackmun feared has
not come to pass.
273. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1721, 1761 (2002).
274. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 883–84 (1991) (quoting GORDON WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787 143 (1969)).
275. See supra notes 100–102 and accompanying text (discussing Ryder and proceedings
after remand).
276. See supra text accompanying notes 260–261.
277. For example, the President’s executive actions concerning immigration have been the
subject of much debate. See Michael Bargo, Jr., Obama Shreds Constitution, AM. THINKER
(Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2014/11/obama_shreds
_constitution.html [https://perma.cc/KE7P-BFY7].
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requirements. An individual who was appointed by the wrong process, entity, or
person can still be appointed by the constitutionally appropriate one. A matter that
was improperly adjudicated in an Article I court can be adjudicated in an Article III
court, and the Article III court can reach the same outcome as the Article I court.
Congress can legislate the same norms that violate the nondelegation doctrine when
the executive enacts them without sufficient legislative guidance. The President
could retain or remove an officer that the legislative branch, without proceeding
through impeachment proceedings, had attempted to retain or remove. In contrast,
other limitations on government actions, principally those in the Bill of Rights and
other constitutional amendments, concern what the government can substantively do:
abridge the right to free speech, constrain the free exercise of religion, limit gun
ownership, take property without reasonable compensation, or inflict cruel and
unusual punishment. Although not free from all indeterminacy, the structural concept
is established and cabined (especially because the structural provisions in the
Constitution are necessarily limited in number) and thus may be even better defined
than its “procedural” counterpart.278
Indeed, the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court’s discussion of harm in the
context of structural safeguards reveals their similarity to procedural rights. In
Landry v. FDIC, the D.C. Circuit rejected the government’s argument that a
regulated party had to show prejudice from an administrative law judge’s alleged
unconstitutional appointment.279 In so doing, the court noted that the Supreme Court
in Ryder left open the question of whether harmless error could apply.280 But it noted
that the Court had referred to separation-of-powers safeguards (including those
arising under the Appointments Clause) as “structural.”281 These structural errors
require automatic reversal without regard to harm.282 The Supreme Court, in fact,
said that structural safeguards are not “a remedy to be applied only when specific
harm, or risk of specific harm, can be identified.”283 Thus, treating structural
challenges like procedural ones not only makes sense but even fits comfortably
within separation-of-powers doctrine and rhetoric.
Finally, the courts’ relaxed (or absent) injury requirement for structural violations
to federal administrative architecture is consistent with the relaxed injury
requirement for “structural errors” in the judicial process. For instance, courts do not
require a showing of causally-related harm for matters that go to the structure of a

278. The differences in statutory or regulatory procedural rights, on one hand, and
constitutional structural rights, on the other, are not meaningful for Article III standing
purposes. To be sure, they originated from different sources, and, as discussed above, may
affect agencies in different ways. But these differences, alone, do not concern Article III
standing. None of these differences affect whether the plaintiff has an injury in fact, whether
the government had to follow some norm, or whether the harm could be cured on remand.
Instead, these differences may affect whether the provision at issue conveys an express or
implied private cause of action. See infra Part III.B.
279. 204 F.3d 1125, 1130–31 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
280. See id. at 1130 (citing Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182–83 (1995)).
281. See id. at 1130–31 (citing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 878–79 (1991) and Plaut
v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995)).
282. See id.
283. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 239.
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judicial trial, including the appearance of impartiality of the judge, the denial of a
criminal defendant’s right to counsel, the exclusion of certain races from the jury, or
the denial of a public trial.284 In all of these cases, the error concerns how the judiciary
went about exercising its powers, but it does not assume that the court, when
complying with structural protections, could not reach the same judgment as before.
Likewise, structural challenges to the administrative state concern how (and who
within) the government acts without suggesting that the government cannot, through
proper means, orchestrate the same outcome. In sum, the Court routinely treats
claims that concern how government or courts go about exercising their substantive
powers as different in kind from other challenges.
To be sure, the Court has sometimes indicated that structural errors require no
showing of harm because the presumed harm, often in criminal trials, is extremely
likely.285 Errors concerning government architecture, the argument goes, may not
warrant the same presumption of harm as in criminal matters and thus should not be
deemed structural errors for which no harm is required. But the Court’s stated
likely-harm justification is questionable because presuming harm often presents its
own problems or is unsound. For instance, successful Batson challenges concerning
the exclusion of jurors based on their race are not subject to harmless-error review
and call for an automatic new trial.286 But this remedy is very likely not actually
based on presumed harm to the defendant.287 If it were, courts would have to presume
that jurors of different races would reach different verdicts and would have to engage,
thereby, in the very stereotyping of races (with notions of groupthink) that the Batson
doctrine seeks to prevent.288 Relatedly, defendants are more likely, as the Court has
recognized, to cause harm to themselves by demanding to proceed pro se in a
criminal trial, instead of relying upon counsel.289 Despite the lack of any likely harm
to the individual in having counsel, the violation of the individual’s Sixth
Amendment right to represent himself or herself is a structural error for which

284. See David A. Perez, Deal or No Deal? Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
During Plea Bargaining, 120 YALE L.J. 1532, 1568–69 (2011).
285. See, e.g., Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury
Representation, and the Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93, 112 (1996) (discussing how the
Court grounded its remedy of automatic reversal after right-to-counsel violation on the
premise that an infected criminal trial “cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for
determination of guilt or innocence”) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499
U.S. 279, 310 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., for the Court in part and dissenting in part)).
286. See, e.g., United States v. McFerron, 163 F.3d 952, 955 (6th Cir. 1998) (“The
government contends that even if the district court committed error [in rejecting the
Defendant’s Batson argument], we should consider such an error harmless. This suggestion
has been resoundingly rejected by every circuit court that has considered the issue.”).
287. Cf., e.g., Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U.S. 320, 329 (1970) (“Defendants in criminal
proceedings do not have the only cognizable legal interest in nondiscriminatory jury selection.
People excluded from juries because of their race are as much aggrieved as those indicted and
tried by juries chosen under a system of racial exclusion.”).
288. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 857, 891 (1999).
289. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984).
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automatic reversal is required.290 These examples reveal that grounding a structural
error on something more than serious, likely individual harm is not novel.
B. Granting a Cause of Action—Rights and Remedies
As with Article III standing, regulated parties should have inferred structural
causes of action because they fit well with existing doctrine. Whether a party should
have a cause of action is an indeterminate inquiry. The current conception of a cause
of action looks at the “operative facts” to determine whether “a plaintiff is entitled to
some remedy,” with less focus than in the past on a particular remedy.291 Because
the Constitution’s text fails to answer whether regulated parties have a cause of action
for structural violations,292 any viable cause of action must be inferred. With statutory
implied private rights of action for damages, the Court has, of late, required clear
legislative intent to create private rights of action.293 But the Court has been much
more permissive of allowing causes of actions premised on the Constitution that seek
only nonmonetary equitable relief.294 This permissive attitude makes sense in the
context of structural challenges, too. Regulated parties fall within the zone of
interests of most structural safeguards, suggesting a colorable individual right in
structural provisions. Although some contend that the historical record undermines
inferred structural rights, that record is, at best, unclear.
1. Colorable Rights in Structural Safeguards
How the Court goes about inferring a private cause of action for equitable relief
under the Constitution is far from settled. It often handles structural cases under a
generalized-grievances standing paradigm and advances no further.295 Or the Court
simply operates with the presumption that equitable relief against the government is
appropriate.296 When considering the more controversial question of whether an
implied cause of action for money damages exists, the Court requires that the basis
for the relief “fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal
Government for the damage sustained.”297 But when the Court considers the
availability of equitable relief under the APA (and, at times, under the
Constitution298), the Court applies what appears to be a more liberal inquiry: the

290. See id.
291. Bellia, supra note 84, at 798 (emphasis omitted).
292. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1449.
293. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–88 (2001).
294. See John F. Preis, In Defense of Implied Injunctive Relief in Constitutional Cases, 22
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 3 (2013).
295. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974) (concerning Receipts
and Expenditures Clause); Taitz v. Obama, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3–4 (D.D.C. 2010) (concerning
Presidential Eligibility Clause).
296. See Preis, supra note 294; Jonathan R. Siegel, Suing the President: Nonstatutory
Review Revisited, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1612, 1613–14 (1997).
297. OPM v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 432 (1990) (quoting United States v. Testan, 424
U.S. 392, 401–02 (1976)).
298. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
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zone-of-interests test. That test requires “the plaintiff [to] establish that the injury he
complains of (his aggrievement, or the adverse effect upon him) falls within the ‘zone
of interests’ sought to be protected by the . . . provision whose violation forms the
legal basis for his complaint.”299 The Court has recently clarified that the
zone-of-interests inquiry asks whether a cause of action exists for a “particular
plaintiff’s claim,”300 although the inquiry may be narrower with provisions, such as
constitutional ones, that exist outside the APA.301 Because of the Court’s recent
reliance on the zone-of-interests test in determining whether a statutory cause of
action exists, because the Court has applied the test to constitutional provisions and
suits for equitable relief, and because the test is as developed as any other for
inferring causes of action, I rely on it for the inquiry here.302
Regulated parties’ challenges easily fall within the structural provisions’ zone of
interests. Their harm is the cost of being regulated by a government that has not
followed constitutional protocols before acting. This harm causes loss to property
(regulatory fines), liberty (ability to act in a certain way or within a certain industry),
or dignity (having to engage in administrative proceedings by an unconstitutional
entity). The Founders intended the structural provisions, as even Choper concedes,
to prevent tyranny and despotism and thereby preserve liberty (and perhaps also
property).303 In fact, Choper says that this understanding “cannot be seriously
disputed.”304 And, as previously discussed, the Court has repeatedly and consistently
noted that the provisions’ purpose is to preserve individual liberty.305 Indeed, in his
recent concurring opinion in NLRB v. Noel Canning, Justice Scalia (joined by three
other Justices), noted that structural provisions are “designed first and foremost not

Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 760 (1982); Bos. Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 320–21
n.3 (1977).
299. Air Courier Conf. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 523–24 (1991)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990)) (internal
quotation omitted). As a corollary, when “the plaintiff is not itself the subject of the contested
regulatory action, the test denies a right of review if the plaintiff’s interests are so marginally
related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be
assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.” Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388,
399 (1987). Presumably, the same standards govern suits based on constitutional, as opposed
to statutory, provisions.
300. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 (2014).
301. See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 400 n.16.
302. This is not to say that the zone-of-interests-test doctrine is without its own problems.
See Sanford A. Church, Note, A Defense of the “Zone of the Interests” Standing Test, 1983
DUKE L.J. 447, 456–59 (describing critics’ views of the test); infra note 307. Nevertheless, the
test has had an ever-expanding place for more than fifty years in the Court’s doctrine and
facilitates easier discussion of implied causes of action than other, lesser defined inquiries. In
other words, I take no position on the propriety of the test as a normative matter; I use it as an
accepted tool for discussing implied causes of action in the regulatory context.
303. See CHOPER, supra note 29, at 264–65.
304. Id. at 264.
305. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
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to look after the interests of the respective branches, but to ‘protect[] individual
liberty.’”306
Even if the branches are more closely connected than regulated parties to the
structural provisions’ purposes, regulated parties are still within the zone of interests.
The Court has noted, albeit in a statutory context, that the subject of a regulatory
action need not be the only one with a cause of action. Because “[t]he test is not
meant to be especially demanding,” the provisions need not be intended to benefit
the plaintiff at issue.307 Instead, the plaintiff need only be “arguably” within the zone
of interests that the provision at issue intends to protect.308 Under these principles, it
is beside the point that the branches of government may be the subjects of the
structural provisions. Instead, it is enough that the regulated parties are within the
zone of interests that the structural provisions seek to further—preserving individual
liberty and limiting despotism.
Relatedly, even if the zone-of-interests test is more demanding in the
constitutional context,309 it should still cover regulated parties’ claims. The regulated
parties can point to a specific invasion of their property or liberty interests because
the agency directly regulates their behavior by, say, ordering the regulated party to
pay a fine or to stop (or start) certain activities.310 In contrast, structural challenges
from the populace at large (taxpayers or voters)311 or perhaps the beneficiaries of a
regulatory regime who seek to challenge an officer or agency’s deviation from
Congress’s regulatory objective provide concrete examples of plaintiffs whose
interests (regardless of Article III standing concerns) are too tangentially related from
the purposes of the underlying structural provisions.312 The relationship between
their interests (whether liberty, property, or dignity) and structural defects are much
more attenuated than regulated parties’.
Analogizing individual enforcement of structural rights to procedural rights helps
allay prudential concerns over structural causes of action. For instance, the fear that
expending judicial resources on litigation that may have little impact on the outcome
seems misplaced because the same concern exists for the much broader category of
procedural rights. Likewise, structural safeguards’ procedural complexion reveals

306. 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2593 (Scalia, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Bond, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2011)).
307. Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399–400 (1987). But see Air Courier Conf.
of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 524–25 (1991) (considering whether
“Congress intended to protect jobs with the Postal Service” when determining if union fell
within zone of interests).
308. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 400.
309. See id. at 400 n.16.
310. Contra Shane, supra note 30 (“[U]nlike other separation of powers disputes that the
Court has resolved – in cases such as Youngstown Steel, Chadha, or Boumediene – Noel
Canning does not relate to individual rights or liberties. . . . Life, liberty and property are
simply not at issue.”).
311. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974)
(stating in the context of an Article III standing inquiry that “[t]he proposition that all
constitutional provisions are enforceable by any citizen simply because citizens are the
ultimate beneficiaries of those provisions has no boundaries”).
312. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 30, at 506 (describing hypothetical where regulatory
beneficiaries assert Appointments Clause challenge against EPA Administrator).
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the shortcomings of the “absolute privilege” objection. Some have argued that
structural safeguards cannot be individual rights because they do not create an
“absolute privilege to act in a certain way,” where an “individual (or firm) has a zone
of privileged action from any federal or state regulation.”313 Instead, structural
safeguards do not create rights, they argue, because “the exact same act by the exact
same individual can plainly be regulated by some governmental entity.”314 But this
argument proves too much because it would also lead courts to stop entertaining
ordinary procedural challenges. Procedural rights provide no “absolute privilege”
from governmental action. Instead, the privilege falls away after the government
complies with procedural requirements, whether statutory or constitutional. Those
requirements may even apply to one sovereign but not another (for example, a state
constitution’s due process requirements that exceed the Federal Constitution’s), but
their limited reach does not prevent individual enforcement.
In the separation-of-powers context, the fact that one branch of government may
face procedural or structural limitations before acting, while another does not, says
nothing about whether individuals can challenge the noncompliance. Structural
rights permit the government to act against the individual when the entity’s
composition complies with structural norms. If the entity does not, it has no authority
to achieve its chosen end, and regulated parties retain their privilege from
government action. This is so even when the structural norms apply to only certain
branches. Due process limitations may be the most obvious example. For instance,
common-law courts and legislatures can establish similar substantive norms although
legislatures need not comply with due process. The mere fact that one branch must
comply with constitutional procedural requirements while another branch does not
has no bearing on whether enforceable rights exist. A private party could seek to
enforce due process protections if a court acted without doing so. Furthermore, one
government entity may be required to follow certain procedures before enacting a
substantive norm, but it may be able to reach the same end by taking another kind of
action without having to comply with those same procedural requirements. For
instance, an agency must comply with due process in adjudication that creates a
substantive norm (like a common-law court’s adjudication), but it likely has little or
no obligations under the Due Process Clause if it enacts that same norm through
rulemaking.315 In other words, the limited reach of a procedural or structural
safeguard to one branch or to certain methods of action does not prevent an individual
from enforcing that safeguard.316

313. Huq, supra note 20, at 1450 (emphasis omitted). Choper made a similar argument:
“[I]f the presidential conduct allegedly violates individual constitutional rights—that is, those
personal liberties that are secured against all governmental abridgements, presidential or
congressional—then . . . the Court should intervene.” CHOPER, supra note 29, at 272 (emphasis
omitted).
314. Huq, supra note 20, at 1451.
315. Compare Londoner v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (holding that due
process attaches to agency adjudications), with Bi-Metallic Invest. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (holding that due process does not reach rulemaking or
quasi-legislative actions).
316. Proponents of the contrary view have offered no reason to support their views. See
CHOPER, supra note 29, at 272; Huq, supra note 20, at 1450–51.
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Finally, challengers’ potential loss in the political realm over the agency’s
structure or powers should not limit their structural challenges.317 Understanding
structural rights as similar to procedural rights is key here, too. It may well be that
challengers lost the substantive battle in the political arena over, say, whether or how
a particular industry or action should be regulated. But the federal government—just
like agencies and courts—has to comply with constitutional and statutory procedural
norms to act. Challenging an agency’s structure may prevent or delay agency action.
Nevertheless, even assuming that seeking such prevention or delay is somehow
improper, losing parties can cause the same delay in procedural challenges, too, such
as those brought under the APA, under the Due Process Clause, or under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Unless one is ready to end procedural challenges generally,
structural challenges should be able to proceed even if their goal is to stop or slow
government action. From an even broader perspective, the mere fact that the
Constitution gives losing factions a weapon against governmental action is neither
novel nor contrary to current conceptions of judicial review—whether in the
procedural or substantive context. Allowing the Constitution to serve as a
countermajoritarian check on legislative action is foundational to judicial review.
Considering the propriety of regulated parties’ structural cause of action from a
zone-of-interest and procedural vantage point is another way of vindicating the
valid-rule doctrine, often encountered in overbreadth or facial challenges. Under this
well-accepted doctrine, “[E]veryone has a personal constitutional right not to be
subjected to governmental sanctions except pursuant to a constitutionally valid rule
of law.”318 Indeed, Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer concurred in Bond by relying
on this doctrine.319 The valid-rule doctrine is consistent with judicial allowance for
procedural challenges and the ability of regulated parties (as contrasted with other
third parties) to demonstrate why they are sufficiently related to the structural
provisions to seek their enforcement. What the doctrine fails to explain is how
structural challenges fulfill Article III standing requirements. The procedural
exception helps fill this void and bolster the valid-rule doctrine.
Armed with examples, Huq argues that because the Court fails to apply the
doctrine consistently to all structural matters, the doctrine cannot explain the Court’s
structural-standing jurisprudence.320 To be sure, the Court’s haphazard use of the
political-question doctrine, as discussed in Part I.C.4, reveals consistency problems
with structural provisions that tend to arise outside of the administrative context. But
Huq’s examples aren’t as damning as they first appear. For instance, he notes that
the Court has significantly limited Bicameralism Clause challenges by deferring
conclusively to congressional leaders’ factual attestation that each congressional

317. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1491–1514.
318. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing,
113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1331 (2000).
319. See Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2367–68 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
320. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1453 (“But [the valid-rule doctrine] is simply not a
plausible account of current constitutional practice. Individual litigants cannot now complain
about any flaw in the official process leading to the enactment of a challenged law.”).
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house passed the bill in question.321 But in the absence of an attested bill and a
conclusive presumption on a matter of fact, the Bicameralism Clause challenge could
proceed. Likewise, he notes that the Court has denied taxpayers and citizens standing
to assert challenges under the Emoluments Clause (which prevents congressional
members from serving in the executive branch while serving in Congress and from
being appointed to offices that were created or given a raise during the congress
member’s elected term322).323 Yet nothing in these cases indicates that a regulated
party’s challenge would be nonjusticiable. His broader point that the Court’s
jurisprudence is inconsistent is correct, but it does not mean that the valid-rule
doctrine is mistaken. Instead, it suggests that the Court should do a better job of
applying the doctrine to all of the Constitution’s structural provisions, relying on
factual presumptions,324 and limiting (or at least better distinguishing) political
questions. Recognizing structural challenges’ analogy to procedural challenges may
well help courts improve their consistency.
Similarly, Huq argues that the courts’ remedial practice—with harmless error,
qualified immunity, and nonretroactivity, for example—undermines the valid-rule
doctrine. I agree, although I identify different culprits in the structural context, such
as severance and stays of judgment.325 But these remedial failings do not indict
regulated parties’ ability to assert structural challenges. Instead, their identification
serves as a call for the Court to improve its remedial practice to render regulated
parties’ causes of action more meaningful.
2. Neither History nor Practice Are to the Contrary
The Founders’ intent as to structural causes of action is too indeterminate to serve
as a meaningful objection to allowing individuals to vindicate structural safeguards.
I am not aware of any direct evidence of whether the Founders intended regulated
parties to have structural causes of action. But Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist No.
78 made the case for significant judicial review, whereby the courts “must . . . declare
all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void.”326 He repeatedly
advocated for broad judicial review to reach “every act of a delegated authority,
contrary to the tenor” of the Constitution.327 Reaffirming the sovereignty of the
people to limit governmental action through the Constitution, he stated that “[n]o

321. See id. (citing Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 486 F.3d 1342, 1351 (D.C. Cir.
2007)) (discussing enrolled-bill rule from Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892)).
322. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
323. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1453–54 (citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop
the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974)); see also Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (per curiam)
(denying motion for leave to file petition concerning Justice Black’s ineligibility to serve on
the Supreme Court based on petitioner’s generalized grievance).
324. For instance, the Supreme Court of Kentucky, along with certain other states, applies
only a prima facie presumption (as opposed to a conclusive one) that an enrolled bill is valid
and permits clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption. See D&W Auto
Supply v. Dep’t of Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Ky. 1980).
325. See supra Part I.C.3.
326. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
327. Id. at 466.
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legislative act . . . contrary to the Constitution[] can be valid.”328 And he stated that
it is the courts’ role “to keep [the legislature] within the limits assigned to their
authority.”329 In other writings, Hamilton said that “there ought always . . . be a
constitutional method of giving efficacy to constructional provisions.”330 Implied
structural causes of action are consistent with Hamilton’s call for strong judicial
review.
To be sure, James Madison failed to mention judicial review in his discussions of
the mechanisms for ensuring the separation of powers.331 But as Raoul Berger
concluded after reviewing the constitutional debates and concern over legislative
aggrandizement, the “[F]ounders must have welcomed any traditional mechanism
that could aid in keeping Congress within bounds.”332 In fact, Berger pointed to
statements of James Wilson during the Pennsylvania ratifying convention that “if any
congressional act should be ‘inconsistent with those powers vested by this instrument
in Congress, the judges . . . will declare such laws to be null and void.’”333 These
calls for significant judicial review do not suggest exceptions for governmental
overstepping.
Huq identifies another of Hamilton’s statements, but it’s inapposite. Huq argues
that Hamilton “urged that the original Constitution—which, of course, contained the
separation of powers and federalism principles—not be understood in terms of vested
rights” because, in arguing against a Bill of Rights, Hamilton argued that the Bill
“would contain various exceptions to powers not granted; and on this very account,
would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted.”334 Yet Hamilton’s
point was not that individuals had no ability to challenge governmental action that
exceeded federal power or violated constitutional provisions.335 His point was that
the Bill of Rights would, contrary to its purpose, undermine individual freedom by
intimating that the federal government had powers not mentioned in the
Constitution’s text.336 Hamilton gives no indication that he eschewed individual
rights in structural provisions. To the contrary, he suggested that rights remain with
the people to prevent government action that is not constitutionally given because he
argued that a bill of rights was unnecessary for a constitution “professedly founded
upon the power of the people.”337 Bradford Clark, reviewing the debates over the Bill

328. Id.
329. Id.
330. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 474 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
331. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 317–22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
332. Berger, supra note 84, at 834 (emphasis in original). The historical absence of
structural challenges by the branches suggests that the Founders may not have viewed these
challenges as “traditional mechanisms” for checking congressional action.
333. Id. at 835 (quoting 2 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 489 (1881)).
334. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1449 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 513 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003)).
335. See id. (“Alexander Hamilton thus urged that the original Constitution—which, of
course, contained the separation of powers and federalism principles—not be understood in
terms of vested rights.”).
336. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 512 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
2003).
337. Id.
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of Rights and federalism, concluded that “the Founders understood individual rights
vis-à-vis the federal government to depend in large measure on the limited nature of
federal power. Given this understanding, it is anachronistic to distinguish sharply
between judicial review under the Bill of Rights and judicial review of the scope of
federal powers.”338
Like the Founders’ intent, more recent congressional intent does not provide
grounds for a meaningful objection. Although congressional intent (as well as its
relevance)339 is far from clear, the APA suggests that structural claims are
permissible. Most regulated parties’ challenges to agency action fall within the APA
(even if the parties fail to recognize this).340 The APA requires courts to set aside
agency action that is, among other things, “contrary to constitutional right, power,
privilege, or immunity.”341 Although the legislative history on the meaning of this
provision is unhelpful,342 it is notable how broadly the provision is written. It does
not limit itself to constitutional rights or privileges. It also refers to actions that are
contrary to constitutional power, a conception that would easily cover actions that
contravene structural safeguards. After all, government action through an agency is
contrary to constitutional power if the agency’s architecture violates structural
principles because those provisions limit how and who within government can act.
It is doubtful that Congress intended the words to serve as appositives for one
another. While privileges, immunities, and rights seem to have broadly consistent
meanings concerning the freedom of an individual from governmental action in
ordinary parlance, power focuses not on individuals but on the government’s
authority to act or not.
Moreover, even if congressional approbation is unclear in the structural context,
longstanding judicial practice awards equitable relief for violations of federal

338. Bradford R. Clark, Unitary Judicial Review, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 319, 337 (2003).
339. See Fletcher, supra note 123, at 223–24 (“Congress should have some, but not
unlimited, power to grant standing to enforce constitutional rights. The nature and extent of
that power should vary depending on the duty and constitutional clause in question.”). In the
statutory context, Justice Kennedy argued in his concurrence in Lujan that Congress has the
power to define injuries broadly and thus bestow standing on a broad section of the public.
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580–81 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 501 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
If Congress’s attempt to define injuries is germane in the constitutional context as well, then
the APA provides relevant guidance on whether challenging parties have standing.
340. See Siegel, supra note 296, at 1669. Key exceptions are for interlocutory challenges,
5 U.S.C. § 704 (requiring final agency action for judicial review of administrative action), and
challenges to actions by the President, the Congress, or other non-agencies, see Franklin v.
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992) (holding that President is not an “agency” under the
APA).
341. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) (2012).
342. Unfortunately, the most specific statement about the provision that I uncovered in the
tome of collected legislative history on the APA was the following from Representative
Springer: “There is no one in the world who could object to a provision of that kind [the
contrary-to-the-constitution provision] because that is based upon the sound philosophy of the
law.” 92 CONG. REC. 5657 (1946) (remarks of Rep. Springer). The four listed terms track
Hohfeld’s well-known list of legal conceptions. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 710 (1917).
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statutory or constitutional law. So-called nonstatutory review (so named because
courts have traditionally provided review without pointing to any statutory authority
for doing so) permits courts—whether or not the APA applies—to provide injunctive
relief against government officers to prevent unconstitutional action or to invalidate
entire statutes on constitutional grounds.343 The longstanding practice of granting
injunctive relief for constitutionally prohibited executive action344 suggests that
courts should have few qualms in awarding equitable relief in structural litigation.
And indeed, the ground for liberal equitable relief comes from the fear that
constitutional limitations on legislative authority (including those concerning how
the legislature may structure the government) “amount to nothing,” a fear that seems
even more pronounced in the structural realm.345 To deny an implied private right of
action for equitable relief for structural matters would be to create an exception to
standard judicial practice.
This is not to say, as I have elsewhere, that courts cannot improve remedial
practice in the structural context. Remedies for structural violations often fail to
incentivize litigants properly or deter the political branches because they seek to
create “as little disruption as possible.”346 But these concerns do not mean that the
courts cannot provide a sufficient remedy. Indeed, sometimes they do, generally by
requiring legislative or executive action.347 Instead, as I discuss in Part IV.B, infra,
it suggests that courts should be more cognizant of effective remedies and ultimately,
from a realist’s perspective, less willing to find violations in the first instance.
Curable remedial insufficiencies should not overcome otherwise strong arguments
for judicial review.
By examining the fit between regulated parties’ standing for structural actions and
other standing doctrine, and the relative ease of inferring a cause of action under
traditional doctrine, one can see that regulated parties’ structural challenges are not
aberrations of justiciability doctrine. Moreover, the procedural exception for causation
and redressability requirements makes normative sense because it is the process, as
opposed to the substantive outcome, that procedural rules seek to regulate. The
doctrinal and institutional limitations on branch standing further complicate the ability
of the branches to serve as defenders for structural norms, and these limitations
provide additional normative support for permitting claims by regulated parties in the
structural context. Calls to abandon the individual action and permit mere branch

343. See Siegel, supra note 296, at 1623; id. at 1668–69 (noting that nonstatutory review
is so common, courts don’t “even think[] about it”); id. at 1669–70. For actions under the
APA, the legislative history indicates that Congress sought to codify so-called nonstatutory
review “where Congress has made no contrary provision for judicial review.” See 92 CONG.
REC. 5654 (1946) (remarks of Rep. Walter).
344. See Preis, supra note 294, at 34–38 (discussing Court’s equitable remedies in
constitutional cases).
345. See Siegel, supra note 296, at 1630 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 466
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
346. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332, 1336–37
(D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2735 (2013).
347. See Barnett, supra note 23, at 527–36 (discussing more successful remedies in Ryder
and Northern Pipeline).
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enforcement—whatever their doctrinal and normative bases—must grapple not only
with doctrinal disruption but also with the normative basis for this doctrine.
IV. ADDRESSING UNDERLYING CONCERNS
To say that individuals should have a cause of action for structural challenges is
not to say that structural challenges should remain as they are. Legitimate concerns
continue to bedevil structural challenges, including the overall utility of structural
litigation (in light of causal and redressability questions),348 challengers’
opportunism in seeking legal redress after losing political fights,349 the failure of the
courts to consider factors that lead to structural innovation and thus not allow the
political branches discretion in creating the administrative state (absent relatively
clear constitutional prohibitions),350 and the limited effectiveness of judicial
remedies for prevailing parties.351 Courts can address many of the problems that
create discomfort with an individual cause of action in less dramatic ways than
denying individuals the right to sue.
The underlying cause of much of these concerns is too much judicial involvement
in structural challenges. For instance, by setting strict branch boundaries, courts
decide matters concerning relatively immaterial structural innovations (such as the
tiered protections from removal in Free Enterprise Fund) and thereby exacerbate
concerns over the utility of structural litigation. Relatedly, judicial decisions that
sharply delineate the branches’ boundaries deny the political branches discretion to
adjust them in the face of new challenges. As the courts reach more issues and
encourage more litigation, they attempt to limit the effect of their rulings by
providing less meaningful remedies.352 Limiting, but not ending, judicial review
mitigates these concerns.
Courts can limit their review by turning, where appropriate, to functionalism for
separation-of-powers jurisprudence. The Court can get there in two ways. First, it
can directly alter the underlying doctrine. Second, if the Court is hesitant to alter its
doctrine directly, it can reach the same ends indirectly by providing more significant
remedies. In doing so, as I explain below, courts will very likely begin to defer to the
political branches without abandoning judicial review altogether.
But, before considering how to alter the underlying substantive law, let me
address a potential objection: Why shouldn’t the Court instead alter its justiciability
doctrine to permit only the most significant challenges and thereby give the branches
more structural discretion? The key reason is that the focus of the justiciability
doctrines is not the quantum of harm or the potential benefits from innovation.
Instead, it focuses on the mere existence of harm (if required). Relatedly,
justiciability doctrines are intended to be trans-substantive because they apply

348.
349.
350.
351.
352.

See supra Part I.C.1.
See Huq, supra note 20, at 1502–14.
See CHOPER, supra note 29, at 298–305; Huq, supra note 28, passim.
See supra Part I.C.3.
See infra notes 379–380 and accompanying text.
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generally to all lawsuits or, at the very least, challenges of a particular kind.353 But
some structural protections, as discussed below, permit more discretion (the
President’s removal power, for instance) than others (say, those under the
Appointments Clause). The underlying doctrine, which is provision-based and not
trans-substantive, can better address how much or little discretion exists for the
political branches as to each structural protection. Moreover, creating more doctrinal
disruption in an already confused area of the law354 is especially troubling in the
structural context because regulated parties’ structural challenges, as discussed
above, fit reasonably well within existing justiciability doctrines and respond to
theoretical concerns over lackluster institutional incentives. For these reasons, the
substantive doctrine itself can better accommodate concerns over structural
challenges.
A. Proper Place for Functionalism and Political Discretion
Formalism is ill-suited for interpreting indeterminate text. This is the case with
the vesting clauses for each branch because they fail to describe where the branches’
boundaries should be. Indeed, it is very difficult to argue that prophylactic boundaries
are appropriate355 after courts have recognized that the boundaries must, by necessity,
be somewhat porous.356 To use the President in an example, the President in
executing the law must create generalized standards to fill statutory gaps (for
instance, when are veterans as a class sufficiently “incapacitated” to trigger
entitlement to benefits?) and adjudicate specific issues (for instance, is a particular
veteran entitled to benefits?). Moreover, as Manning has explained, formalists must
often rely upon a separation-of-powers background norm despite the Founders’ lack
of any agreed-upon baseline norm357 and ignore Congress’s powers under the
Necessary and Proper Clause.358 And there is the concern that certain symbols of a
branch’s power assume disproportionate importance. The removal power, for

353. See, e.g., Michael Coenen, Constitutional Privileging, 99 VA. L. REV. 683, 691–93
(2013); Michael Wells, Naked Politics, Federal Courts Law, and the Canon of Acceptable
Arguments, 47 EMORY L.J. 89, 148–51 (1998).
354. See, e.g., John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent
Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1010 (2002) (referring
to standing doctrine as a “jumbled mess”).
355. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995) (stating that separation of
powers serves as “a prophylactic device, establishing high walls and clear distinctions because
low walls and vague distinctions will not be judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch
conflict”).
356. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (“[T]he Framers did not
require—and indeed rejected—the notion that the three Branches must be entirely separate
and distinct.”); id. at 381 (“Madison recognized that our constitutional system imposes upon
the Branches a degree of overlapping responsibility, a duty of interdependence as well as
independence the absence of which ‘would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of
governing itself effectively.’”) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) (per
curiam)).
357. See Manning, supra note 31, at 1993–2005.
358. See id. at 1986–93.
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instance, has come to symbolize the President’s executive power despite
longstanding questions surrounding its utility.359
Formalism still has a limited role. For instance, it makes sense to apply formalism
to the fairly detailed text of the Appointments Clause and the Bicameralism and
Presentment Clause.360 But its reach should be much more limited than under the
Court’s current jurisprudence for the reasons discussed above.
The Court’s overreliance on formalism has caused much of the concern over
structural actions. By serving as a prophylaxis for demarcating boundaries and
proudly recognizing one concern to the detriment of other values,361 formalism
provides more victories to challengers than functionalism would and thereby
encourages structural litigation over relatively minor structural innovations. Because
the impact of the innovation on the branches or individuals is irrelevant, formalism
encourages litigation whose utility is, at the very least, questionable because the
ruling may do little to protect while invalidating useful structural innovations.362
Relying upon functionalism helps mitigate these concerns because the Court, by
deeming fewer structures unconstitutional, will discourage litigation over minor
structural innovations. Indeed, functionalism has limited nondelegation363 and
Article III challenges.364 Moreover, as structural challenges are generally less
successful, regulated parties will necessarily take their administrative-structure
concerns to the political branches.365
By giving the branches more breathing space, functionalism allows the branches
to set their own boundaries. Huq’s call for allowing the branches to bargain over
structural boundaries (in both a federalism and separation-of-powers context)
comports with original meaning. He notes that nothing in the text prohibits
bargaining, and, indeed, it is consistent with the First Congress’s rejection of
Madison’s proposal to treat the branches’ powers as exclusive (and thereby prevent
structural innovation).366 Moreover, looking at acquiesced-in actions, as the Court

359. See Barkow, supra note 198 (considering other methods of creating agency
independence and noting limited effect of removal power).
360. See Manning, supra note 31, at 1943–44, 1958.
361. See Huq, supra note 27, at 16 (“[T]he Free Enterprise Fund majority opinion is
drafted as if the only constitutional good to be pursued in administrative agency design is
democratic accountability. The Court, that is, ignored the pleadings of scholars who had
pointed to the plurality of goods a reasonable designer could seek to vindicate in drawing up
an administrative agency.”) (emphasis omitted)).
362. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1480–90 (discussing spillover effects in structural
litigation).
363. See, e.g., Randolph J. May, The Public Interest Standard: Is It Too Indeterminate To
Be Constitutional?, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 427, 443 (2001) (“[T]he Whitman decision does not
foreclose the possibility that nondelegation challenges can be successfully (if only rarely)
mounted in the future.”).
364. Article III challenges outside of bankruptcy are exceedingly rare.
365. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1491–1508 (discussing regulated parties’ litigating
purposes and concerns over allowing “losers” in political process to use structural challenges
to pursue deregulatory goals).
366. See Huq, supra note at 28, at 1649.
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recently did in Noel Canning, can reveal the branches’ accumulated wisdom.367 After
all, from a perspective of institutional competence, the political branches have access
to factors that “courts systematically lack,” such as political costs, responses from
other political actors, relevant norms within bureaucratic institutions, and the
efficacy of other constitutional or political instruments to control agency costs.368
Of course, there are limits to this discretion and bargaining.369 Providing a
governing rule under a functionalist approach is probably impossible (and therein
lies the allure of rigid formalism), but one could do worse than the standard that the
Court in Morrison v. Olson applied—asking whether a structural innovation impeded
the central functions of the branch at issue.370 Morrison, however, can be criticized
for misapplying its standard in that case (because the President’s control over
prosecutors is central to the effective functioning of the executive branch, as the
Clinton-Lewinsky investigation later suggested)371 and for not giving the standard
more definition by identifying prohibited structures. Despite Morrison’s failing,
certain structural “innovations” would likely command widespread condemnation.
For instance, the political branches should not be permitted to limit the President’s
power to remove key Cabinet members—such as the Secretary of State or Secretary
of Defense—whose positions go to the heart of traditional and constitutionally
specified executive powers over foreign affairs and national defense.372 Likewise,
permitting only Article I courts to decide constitutional questions would likely
violate Article III because it strikes at the heart of Article III courts’ power of judicial
review and the rationale for creating a judiciary independent of the political branches.
Outside of these and similarly significant structural innovations, the branches
deserve discretion. By granting the branches room while retaining judicial review for
especially troubling cases, courts can provide the discretion that the political question
doctrine permits without allowing the constitutional safeguards to become merely
aspirational.373

367. See id. at 1625; see also passim NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014)
(relying on historical practice surrounding recess appointments to determine what qualifies as
a “recess” and when vacancies “happen”).
368. Huq, supra note 27, at 72.
369. Manning, supra note 31, at 1989 (“Even an indeterminate bargain, however, has
boundaries.”); see NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2573–77 (2014) (finding violation
of Recess Appointment Clause, despite largely functionalist reasoning in prior portions of the
opinion, because three-day break between pro forma Senate sessions was insufficient to permit
recess appointments).
370. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691–92 (1988) (“[W]e simply do not see how the
President’s need to control the exercise of that discretion is so central to the functioning of the
Executive Branch as to require . . . that the counsel be terminable at will by the President.”).
371. See Barnett, supra note 200, at 1356 (noting Kenneth Starr’s investigation into
Whitewater highlighted the problems with permitting independent counsel to investigate the
executive branch).
372. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 & § 3 (referring to
powers “to make Treaties” and “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers”).
373. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 151, at 132.
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B. The Utility of Maximal Remedies
Because of the Court’s general trend in favor of formalism,374 it may be hesitant
to return to functionalism. But there is a way of getting there more gradually and
indirectly—by providing more significant remedies. As I have argued elsewhere, the
courts’ minimalistic remedies for prevailing parties in structural litigation undermine
structural safeguards. Recall that this minimalism takes shape by using severance, de
facto doctrines, and stays of judgment.375 I have suggested that courts provide more
meaningful remedies, such as requiring the political branches—without stays of
judgment or de facto doctrines as countervailing forces—to enact curative
legislation for the agency to continue acting.376 By doing so, they provide, for
instance, a better chance for the challenging party to get something beneficial from
the successful challenge (an incapacitated agency) and a meaningful rebuke to the
political branches to deter future structural violations.377 But I asked—but did not
resolve—whether such remedies may unfairly affect those who rely upon the agency
to go about their businesses and favor parties who advance a deregulatory agenda.378
After more reflection, I conclude that maximalist remedies are likely to prove
useful, even if accompanied by some unfair consequences, because they will be rare.
My reasoning, although perhaps paradoxical, is simple: as judicial remedies expand,
the underlying rights shrink.379 This phenomenon exists because courts do not seek to
expend judicial capital on defending judgments with significant resistance, either
because of political backlash or pragmatic problems for third parties.380 Empirical
evidence of this phenomenon is limited, as Daryl Levinson has noted, by our inability
to know whether judges would act differently with different remedial regimes in place,
but we can evaluate how judges have responded over time to maximal remedies.381
The inverse relationship between remedies and rights is perhaps most evident in
Fourth Amendment litigation, where the powerful exclusionary rule came to limit the
reach of the underlying right to be free from warrantless searches and seizures.382
Similarly, the Supreme Court has limited the notion of a “liberty interest” in the face
of significant monetary remedies for due process violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.383

374. See supra Part I.B.
375. See supra Part I.C.3.
376. See Barnett, supra note 23, at 538–39.
377. Cf. David H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 639,
644 (2008) (arguing that when courts use severance too freely, “the legislature may come to
depend on the courts to fix statutes rather than doing the hard work necessary to enact a
properly tailored statute in the first instance”).
378. See Barnett, supra note 23, at 538–39.
379. See Levinson, supra note 288, 866–70.
380. See Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 589–91 (1983).
381. See Levinson, supra note 288, at 890 (discussing methodological problems with
obtaining empirical evidence and noting “the best we can do is observe the changes in judicial
decisionmaking over time and test likely causes”).
382. See William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV.
881 (1991).
383. See Levinson, supra note 288, at 892–94 (discussing the Court’s decision in Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), which held that reputation does not count as a liberty interest
under the Due Process Clause).
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One may observe this inverse relationship, too, from a partly controlled experiment
concerning whether trial and appellate courts find the same number of Batson
violations, that is, challenges to the exclusion of a juror based on that juror’s race.
Faced with a Batson violation, trial judges can simply include the wrongly excluded
juror, while appellate courts must order a new trial for this structural defect.384 Pamela
Karlan found that appellate courts—which must issue a more severe remedy than trial
courts—hesitate more than trial courts in finding a Batson violation.385 In the
separation-of-powers context, maximal remedies should likewise be rare.
Congress, for its part, should express its desire for maximal judicial remedies to
obtain more discretion. The Court’s current presumption is that Congress prefers the
severance of structural defects instead of the invalidation of the agency’s organic act
or substantive power.386 In Free Enterprise Fund, for instance, the Court severed a
removal provision after saying that it generally sought to sever structural defects
when the remainder of the act could function independently and when Congress did
not make it “evident” through statutory text or historical context that it would prefer
a maximalist remedy.387 To have courts apply maximalist remedies in the future,
Congress needs to overcome this presumption by clarifying in newly enacted
legislation that it intends courts not to sever structural violations. Although the
political branches fear administrative disruption, the disruption, as discussed above,
should be rare and ultimately give the branches more discretion in structural matters.
Turning to maximalist remedies does no violence to the Court’s general remedial
practice. First, the Court’s presumption concerning severance remains, but the
presumption is overcome (perhaps categorically over time) if Congress makes its
preference for maximalist remedies for structural defects clear. The Court need not
alter its baseline for all constitutional remedies. Second, it makes sense to seek
maximalist remedies here, as opposed to other constitutional rights, to give the
prevailing parties a meaningful benefit. As I have argued elsewhere, structural
remedies are less effective than remedies for most other constitutional rights. With
the enforcement of substantive rights, the prevailing party gets something—the
ability to act in a certain way and the ability to avoid government sanction.388 This
benefit is not always certain with procedural rights; the right to procedure does not
guarantee a favorable outcome. But typical administrative procedures—such as the
right to comment on agency action, limits on ex parte communications, or

384. See id. at 891–92 (citing Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal
Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2015 (1998)).
385. See id. Levinson notes that notions of appellate deference to trial-court observations
may play a part in the more limited appellate findings of a Batson violations, but he contends
that “Karlan’s study should be counted as strong evidence that the scope of the Batson right
on appeal has been diminished by the reversal remedy.” Id. at 892.
386. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508 (2010).
387. Id. at 508–10.
388. See Barnett, supra note 23, at 502, 515 n.190. To be sure, challenges may decrease in
number if challengers noticed the ineffective remedies awaiting them at judgment. But history
(and current challenges, see, e.g., First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief ¶¶ 240–45, State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Geithner, No. 1:12-cv-01032 (D.D.C.
Sept. 20, 2012), 2012 WL 4229466 (asserting several structural challenges to the CFPB)),
suggests that they have not noticed or have otherwise allowed hope to spring eternal.
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requirements for impact studies—often affect substantive decisions.389 Structural
safeguards, however, seem even less likely than run-of-the-mill procedural rights to
affect agency action. Because the prevailing party is less likely to obtain any benefit
from the challenge, the remedy must be more significant than in other constitutional
litigation to incentivize litigation and deter structural defects. A maximalist remedy
that hinders regulation likely qualifies. Nevertheless, in a balanced fashion, a more
functionalist doctrine that finds few structural defects will limit the number of
challenges to the most meaningful.
One of the benefits of turning to remedies for structural challenges is that it causes
little disruption to existing doctrine. Courts have given scant attention to these
remedies. They are undertheorized, barely discussed, and often provided without the
parties’ request.390 Because of the relationship between remedies and rights, by
turning to remedies and providing significant ones, courts can adjust the doctrine
gradually. Nor is there anything improper about doing so as long as the Court is
candid about what it is doing. Elsewhere, I have argued that the Court should not
pretend that structural safeguards are more important than their remedies indicate.391
Maximal remedies would be congruent with the importance that the Court has
ascribed to structural safeguards, while recognizing, even if only over a series of
decisions, that those safeguards should refer to core protections or those that have a
strong textual basis in the Constitution.
Finally, the disruption that maximal remedies cause will be limited and
appropriate. Because the rights will constrict as the remedies become stronger, the
use of the remedies will be rare and thereby limit the instances of disruption. But
when the remedies apply, the disruption that they cause will be appropriate because
the structural defect will go to the core of the structural safeguard or violate a specific
constitutional requirement. An agency, for instance, whose principal officers are all
improperly appointed (as in Buckley v. Valeo) should not function. The disruption is
appropriate because Congress has ignored straightforward constitutional
requirements. The Court should seek to deter Congress and require it to absorb
political fallout from the structural defect. And the Court should give the challenging
party something that it seeks—a deregulatory remedy—to incentivize the regulated
party’s suit. In this way, the putative vice of maximal remedies becomes their virtue.
And, at any rate, the political branches aren’t helpless. They can seek to mitigate the
disruption by taking curative action, such as by providing, as the political branches
did in Noel Canning, unquestionably constitutional appointments before judicial
decision.392
C. Achieving Optimal Enforcement
Validating, yet limiting, individual structural actions with more functional
jurisprudence and maximalist remedies provides optimal enforcement of

389. See Barnett, supra note 23, at 511–12.
390. See supra Part I.C.3.
391. See Barnett, supra note 23, at 541–44.
392. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2558 (2014) (“[T]he President has
nominated others to fill the positions once occupied by Members Block, Griffin, and Flynn,
and that the Senate has confirmed these successors.”).
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constitutional structural norms. The optimal amount of enforcement is not static
throughout the Constitution. Instead, as discussed supra in Part IV.A, Manning has
persuasively demonstrated that formalism should apply to well-defined structural
provisions and functionalism should apply to open-ended provisions. The formalist
provisions benefit the most from rigorous individual enforcement, while the
functional provisions need only occasional defense and should properly remain
largely within the discretion of the political branches to define.
First, regulated parties’ ability to enforce provides a meaningful check on
governmental action when the political branches have failed to heed defined
structural limitations. The political branches’ failure is most evident with the more
formalist provisions, such as the Appointments Clause violations in Buckley v. Valeo,
where both the President and the Senate permitted the dilution of their appointment
and consent powers,393 or such as the bicameralism and presentment violations in
INS v. Chadha, where both the President and the Congress, once again, permitted
dilution of their powers to agree to legislative action.394 Regulated parties in both
instances validated the clear, detailed structural provisions. Permitting regulated
parties’ actions does not impede the political branches from enforcing structural
protections; the regulated parties merely serve as a second line of defense when the
branches fail to do so.
Second, the regulated parties can protect the functional structural provisions from
the political branches’ abuses of discretion. The political branches properly have
significant discretion in defining the boundaries between the branches through the
Vesting Clauses because the Founders did not prove strict boundaries or even agree
on what underlying principles should guide the separation of powers generally.395
Moreover, the necessary overlap of legislative, executive, and judicial functions
reveals the impossibility of setting crisp boundaries between the branches, and this
indeterminacy permits the political branches to account for the various values and
goals that they hope to balance or achieve with components of the administrative
state.396 But such discretion can be abused, as I suggested it was with the overly
independent counsel in Morrison v. Olson.397 It is in these rare cases that the
regulated parties’ ability to sue and obtain a meaningful remedy adds value and
permits optimal enforcement.
Let me conclude with a final, possible objection. Do these benefits of litigation
matter if the Founders’ connection between liberty and separated powers was
mistaken either originally or in the modern administrative state?398 In other words,
should we waste judicial energy in enforcing structural provisions whose utility is
questionable?
Even assuming that the Founders overstated the connection between liberty and
separated powers, that mistake should be corrected by constitutional revision, not
judicial dereliction. The formalist provisions have not meaningfully prevented

393. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
394. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
395. See supra Part I.B.
396. See supra Part IV.A.
397. 487 U.S. 654 (1988); supra Part IV.A.
398. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1484–89 (arguing that the link between liberty and
structural requirements is contestable empirically and normatively).
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government action (because, after curing the structural defect, the government almost
always pursues the same substantive policy) and thus require no judicial self-help to
keep the federal government functioning. Moreover, such self-help is especially
troubling in the structural context because the judiciary, by refusing to enforce
relatively detailed provisions whose purpose is well understood and instead
championing its own notions of good constitutional policy, would usurp
constitutional (and macrolegislative) prerogative. The danger of the courts ignoring
structural prohibitions becomes even more apparent when one considers the
normative case for the judiciary ignoring court-related procedural requirements
merely because the court doesn’t think that the constitutional framers or legislature
made the correct policy decision in the first instance.
CONCLUSION
As this Article’s title suggests, my goal here is to further two independent
conversations and reveal how they relate to one another. First, regulated parties
should have standing for separation-of-powers challenges. That is, they should have
a justiciable cause of action based on separation-of-powers protections because these
actions, contrary to recent scholarship, rest well within current doctrine and
normative goals of judicial review. Second, scholars and jurists should stand up to
the Court’s currently overly formalistic separation-of-powers jurisprudence. A more
functionalist jurisprudence will better address lingering litigation-utility concerns
than fiddling with justiciability. Regulated parties’ challenges, when properly
limited, provide the best mechanism for providing enforcement of constitutional
structural safeguards while still allowing the political branches to structure an
effective administrative state.

